THE ASIAGO PLATEAU
About the middle of March the British
Divisions moved up from the Montello to the Asiago
Plateau, and all the British Heavy Artillery was concentrated
in the Asiago sector. We, therefore, moved
six miles to the west and found ourselves in support
of British, and no longer of Italian, Infantry.
Our Brigade ceased to be a “trench-punching”
and became a “counter-battery” Brigade.
Most of our work in future was to be in close co-operation
with our own Air Force.
My Battery was destined to remain
here, with two short interludes, for seven months.
It was in many ways a very interesting sector.
The British held the line between the Italians on
their left and the French on their right. To
the right of the French were more Italians. The
move had amusing features. One compared the demeanour
of the lorry drivers of different nationalities.
The scared faces of some of the British the first
time they had to come up the hundred odd corkscrew
turns on the mountain roads, taking sidelong glances
at bird’s eye views of distant towns and rivers
on the plain below, were rather comical. Even
the self-consciously efficient and outwardly imperturbable
French stuck like limpets to the centre of the road,
and would not give an inch to Staff cars, hooting
their guts out behind them. The Italian drivers,
on the other hand, accustomed to the mountains, dashed
round sharp corners at full speed, avoiding innumerable
collisions by a fraction of an inch, terrifying and
infuriating their more cautious Allies. But I
only once saw a serious collision here in the course
of many months.
The Asiago Plateau is some eight
miles long from west to east, with an average breadth
of two to three miles from north to south. On
it lie a number of villages and small towns, of which
the largest is Asiago itself, which lies at the
eastern end of the Plateau and before the war had
a population of about 8000. Asiago was the
terminus of a light railway, running down the mountains
to Schio. The chief occupation of the inhabitants
of the Plateau had been wood-cutting and pasture.
In Asiago were several sawmills and a military
barracks. Army manoeuvres used often to take
place in this area, which gave special opportunities
for the combined practice of mountain fighting and
operations on the flat. It was moreover within
seven miles of the old Austrian frontier. Asiago
was hardly known before the war to foreign tourists,
but many Italians used to visit it, especially for
winter sports.
Across the Plateau from north to south
ran the Val d’Assa, which near the southern
edge, having become only a narrow gulley, turned away
westwards, the Assa stream flowing finally into
the river Astico. The Ghelpac stream, which flowed
through the town of Asiago, joined the Assa
at its western turn. Apart from these two streams
the Plateau was not well watered. In summer,
when the snows had melted, water was even scarcer
on the surrounding mountains. All our drinking
water had to be pumped up through pipes from the plain.
The Plateau was bounded at its eastern
end by Monte Sisemol, which stands at the head of
the Val Frenzela, which, in turn, runs eastward into
the Val Brenta near the little town of Valstagna.
Sisemol was of no great height and was not precipitous.
It had a rounded brown top, when the snow uncovered
it. But it was a maze of wire and trenches, and
a very strong point militarily. There had been
very bitter fighting for its possession last November
and it had remained in Austrian hands.
At the western end the Plateau was
bounded by the descent to the Val d’Astico.
On the northern side of the Plateau rose a formidable
mountain range, the chief heights of which, from west
to east, were Monte Campolungo, Monte Erío,
Monte Mosciagh and Monte Longara. This range
was thickly wooded with pines, among which our guns
did great damage. I always more regretted the
destruction of trees than of uninhabited houses, for
the latter can be the more quickly replaced. This
range was pierced by only four valleys, through each
of which ran roads vital to the Austrian system of
communications, the Val Campomulo, the Val di
Nos, the Val d’Assa and the Val di
Martello. The Austrians had also a few roads
over the top of the mountains, but these were less
good and less convenient.
Along the southern side of the Plateau
ran another ridge, less mountainous than the ridge
to the north, and completely in our possession.
This ridge also was thickly wooded, and pierced by
only a few valleys and roads. The road we came
to know best was the continuation of the wonderful
road up from the plain, through Granezza to the cross-roads
at Pria dell’ Acqua, and on through
the Baerenthal Valley to San Sisto. Thence it
led through the front line trenches into the town
of Asiago itself. At Pria dell’
Acqua, a most misleading name, where there was
no water, but only a collection of wooden huts, another
road branched off westwards, running parallel to the
front line, behind the southern ridge of the Plateau.
The Italian Engineers had created
a magnificent network of roads in this sector of the
Front. Before the war there had been only one
road into Asiago from the plain. Now there
were half a dozen, all broad and with a fine surface,
capable of taking any traffic. And, in addition,
there were many transverse roads, equally good, joining
up and cutting across the main routes at convenient
points.
When the British troops took over
this sector in March, the whole Plateau, properly
so called, was in Austrian hands. It had been
taken last November in the mountain offensive which
followed Caporetto. At one perilous moment the
Austrians had held San Sisto and their patrols had
passed Pria dell’ Acqua, but they
had been thrown back by Italian counter-attacks to
the line they now held. Our front line ran along
the southern edge of the Plateau, and, on the right,
along the lower slopes of the southern ridge, just
inside the pine woods. On the left, further west,
it ran mostly on the flat and more in the open.
Where the Val d’Assa turned west, our front
line ran on one side of the shallow gulley and the
Austrian on the other. The Austrian front line
was completely in the open. The first houses
of Asiago were only a few hundred yards behind
it.
From the defensive point of view our
line was very strong, and the trenches, particularly
at the eastern end, very good, deeply blasted in the
rock. The wooded ridge, running close behind our
front line all the way, completely hid from the enemy
all movement in our rear. He could get no observation
here except by aircraft. Even movements in our
front line, owing to the trees, were largely invisible
at a distance, and, owing to the lie of the ground,
large parts of No Man’s Land could be seen from
our own trenches, but from nowhere in the enemy’s
lines, with the result that we were able to post machine
guns, trench mortars and even, for a short time, a
field battery there, without being detected, until
these weapons had served their immediate purpose.
Our systems of transport, supply and reliefs of the
troops in the line could, therefore, be carried out
at any hour of the day or night with almost complete
disregard of the enemy. His intermittent shelling
of the roads was perfectly blind and haphazard and
seldom did us any damage.
He, on the other hand, was in a very
undesirable situation. Not only was his front
line all the way in full view from our various ground
O.P.’s, but a long stretch of flat country several
miles broad behind his front line was equally in view.
Only a few small folds in the ground were invisible
from all points along our ridge. We could see
also most of the nearer slopes of the northern ridge,
though here the thick woods and breaks in the hillside
gave him greater opportunities for concealment.
Taking into account, therefore, ground observation
only, we had him at a tremendous disadvantage.
He dared not move nor show himself in daylight behind
his line, and was compelled to carry out all his supply
and troop movements at night, or during fogs that
might lift at any moment. One French Battery
did no other work except sweep up and down his roads
throughout the hours of darkness, and it is obvious
that the probable damage done in this way was far
greater than anything he could hope to do to us.
Taking into account the possibilities
of observation from the air, the balance in our favour
became even greater. We had a strong superiority
in the air, whenever it was worth our while to enforce
it, partly because our airmen were individually superior
to the Austrians, and partly because we had more and
better machines. Our pilots often flew over the
northern ridge, both to observe and to bomb, but the
enemy seldom crossed the southern ridge. His
anti-aircraft Batteries were, however, at least as
good as ours, and, in my opinion, better.
Most of our pre-arranged counter-battery
shoots were carried out with aeroplane observation
against enemy Batteries situated in the thick woods
on the slopes of the northern ridge, the airman flying
backwards and forwards over the target and sending
us his observations by wireless. But it was often
necessary to spend more than half of the four hundred
rounds allotted to a normal counter-battery shoot in
destroying the trees round the target, before the
airman could get a good view of it. Flying, however,
was always difficult on the Plateau, especially during
the winter, and more difficult for our men than for
theirs, since there were no feasible landing-places
behind our lines. Our nearest aérodromes
were down on the plain, and a big expenditure of petrol
was required to get the airman up the mountains and
actually over the Plateau, and also to get him down
again. The time during which he could keep in
the air for observation was, therefore, very limited.
Weather conditions on the Plateau, moreover, were
often very unfavourable for flying even in the spring
and summer. The practical importance of our superiority
in the air was thus smaller than might have been expected.
From the defensive point of view,
then, our position was pretty strong. But the
sector was important and might at any time become critical,
and much depended upon its successful defence.
For the mountain wall that guarded the Italian plain
had been worn very thin in this neighbourhood by the
Austrian successes of last year. An Austrian advance
of another few miles would bring the enemy over the
edge of the mountains, with the plain beneath in full
view. Further defence would then become extremely
difficult and costly, and the whole situation, as regards
relative superiority of positions and observation,
now so greatly in our favour, would be more than reversed.
We were too near the edge to have any elbow room or
freedom of manoeuvre. Our present positions were
almost the last that we could hope to hold without
very grave embarrassment. It would have seemed
evident, then, that to obtain more elbow room and security,
we should not be content with a defensive policy, but
should aim at gaining ground and thickening the mountain
wall by means of an early local offensive, even if
larger operations were not yet practicable.
But, from the offensive point of view,
our position presented great difficulties. To
make only a small advance would leave us worse off
than now. Merely to go out into the middle of
the Plateau, merely to reoccupy the ruins of Asiago,
would be futile, except for a very slight and transitory
“moral effect.” To carry the whole
Plateau and establish a line along the lower slopes
of the northern ridge would be no better. We
should only be taking over the difficulties of the
enemy in respect of his exposed positions, while he
would escape from these difficulties and obtain an
immunity from observation nearly as great as that which
we now possessed. No offensive would benefit
us which did not give us, at the very least, the whole
of the crest of the northern ridge. And to aim
at this would be a big and risky undertaking, involving
perhaps heavy casualties and large reserves.
We had only three British Divisions in Italy at this
time, the 7th, 23rd and 48th, two of which were always
in the line and one in reserve. The French had
now only two Divisions in Italy and the Italians,
when the German advance in France became serious,
had sent to France more men than there were French
and British left in Italy. The large fact remained
that, since the military collapse of Russia the previous
year, the Austrians had brought practically their
whole Army on to the Italian Front and established
a large superiority over the Italians, both in numbers
and in guns. Considerable Italian reserves had
to be kept mobile and ready to meet an Austrian offensive
anywhere along the mountain front or on the plain.
There was not likely to be much that could be safely
spared to back up a Franco-British offensive on the
Plateau. None the less, the value of a successful
offensive here was recognised to be so great, that
it was several times on the point of being attempted
in the months that followed. But it did not finally
come, until events elsewhere had prepared the way and
sapped the enemy’s power of resistance.
This, however, is anticipating history.
In March, when we first arrived, we moved into a Battery
position in the pine woods behind the rear slope of
the southern ridge. Our right hand gun was only
a hundred yards from the cross-roads at Pria
dell’ Acqua, disagreeably close, as
we afterwards discovered. For the enemy had those
cross-roads “absolutely taped,” as the
expression went. In other respects the Battery
position was a good one. Being an old Italian
position, it had gun pits already blasted in the rock,
though they were not quite suited to our guns and
line of fire, and we had to do some more blasting for
ourselves. In the course of this, a premature
explosion occurred, wounding one of our gunners so
severely that he lost one leg and the sight of both
his eyes and a few days later, perhaps fortunately,
died of other injuries. He was a Cornishman,
very young and very popular with every one in the
Battery. We missed him greatly. In this same
accident Winterton was also injured, and nearly lost
an eye. He went to Hospital and thence to England,
and saw no more of the war, for the sight of his eye
came back to him but slowly.
The Italians had also blasted some
good caverne in the position, and these we
gradually enlarged and multiplied, till we had cover
for the whole Battery. Being on the side of a
hill, and our guns not constructed to fire at a greater
elevation than forty-five degrees (the Italians had
fired at “super-elevations” up to eighty),
we had to cut down many trees in front of the guns.
But this clearance hardly showed in aeroplane photographs,
as there were already many bare patches in the woods.
We had perfect flash-cover behind the ridge and were,
indeed, quite invisible, when the guns were camouflaged,
even to an aeroplane flying low and immediately overhead.
From our position we could shoot, if necessary, right
over the top of the northern ridge, on the other side
of the Plateau. And this was good enough for most
purposes.
We prepared another position, which
was known as the “Forward” or “Battle
Position,” at San Sisto, about four hundred yards
behind the front line. This position we never
occupied, but we should have done so, if an offensive
had come from our side while we were still on the
Plateau. San Sisto, I was told, was once the centre
of a leper reservation. There is a little chapel
there, but no other buildings. This chapel was
used by the R.A.M.C. as a First Aid Post. One
day I saw a shell go clean through the roof of it,
but there was no one inside at the time.
The Battery O.P. was a glorious place,
up a tall pine tree on the summit of Cima del
Taglio, a high point to the east of the Granezza Pria
dell’ Acqua road. This O.P. had
been built by the French. It was reached by a
strong pinewood ladder, with a small platform half
way up as a resting-place. The O.P. itself consisted
of a wooden platform, nailed to cross pieces, supported
on two trees. It was about fifteen feet long and
four feet broad and some ninety feet above the ground.
At one end of the platform a hut had been erected,
with a long glass window, opening outward, on the
northern side, and a small fixed glass window on the
western. The other end of the platform was uncovered.
When the weather was bad one could shelter in the
hut and imagine oneself out at sea, as the trees swayed
in the wind. The O.P. was well hidden from the
enemy by the branches of the trees. The view
was superb. Immediately below the thick pine
forest sloped gradually downwards, the trees still
carrying a heavy weight of snow. Among the trees
patches of deep snow were visible, hiding rocky ground.
Beyond lay the Plateau, studded with villages and
isolated houses, with the ruins of Asiago in the
centre of the view, and, to the left of it, the light
railway line and its raised embankment, along which
the Austrian trenches ran. And beyond, more pinewoods
on the northern ridge, and beyond, more mountains,
one snowy range behind another, up to the horizon.
The visibility was often poor and variable from one
minute to another. Great clouds used to sweep
low over the Plateau, blotting out everything but
the nearest trees, and then sweep past, and Asiago
would come into sudden view again, and the sun would
shine forth once more upon the little clusters of white
houses, some utterly wrecked, some mere shells, others
as yet hardly touched by the destruction of war.
The prosaic name of this O.P. was “Claud.”
There was another O.P. called Ascot,
which we used sometimes to man at the beginning.
It was on, or rather in, Monte Kaberlaba, just behind
the front line, approached through a communication
trench and then a long tunnel through the rock, named
by our troops the Severn Tunnel. This tunnel
was full of water and many worse things, and it was
impossible to clean it out properly. The unfortunate
telephonists off duty had to live and sleep in it.
The O.P. was a cramped, little, stinking place at
the far end of the tunnel, shared with the Italians,
undoubtedly visible and well known to the enemy, and
with practically no view. The Major, by his usual
skilful diplomacy, soon arranged that we should man
Claud permanently, but Ascot never.
My only pleasant recollection of Ascot
is that once, about midnight, as we were keeping watch
together, a young Italian gunner from the Romagna
sang to me.
“‘Addio, mia
bell’, addio!’
Cantava nel partir
la gioventú,
Mentre gl’ imboscati
si stavano
Divertire, giornale
in mano
E la sigaretta.
Per noi l’assalto
Alla baionetta!
Come lé mosche noi
dobbiam morir,
Mentre gl’ imboscati
si stanno a divertir."
“Good-bye, my darling, good-bye!”
Sang the young men as they went
away,
While the imboscati were standing
about
To amuse themselves, with a newspaper
in their hand
And a cigarette.
For us the bayonet charge!
Like flies we must die.
While the imboscati stand about
to amuse themselves.
This is one of many front line versions
of a patriotic drawing-room song. It has an admirable
tune.]
He sang me also another longer song,
composed by a friend of his, which is not fit for
reproduction.
We experienced great variations of
weather on the Plateau. When we first arrived
in March the snow was in full thaw, and every road
a sunlit, rushing torrent. We climbed about at
that time in gum boots. Later it snowed again
heavily and often. Sometimes for several days
running we were enveloped in a thick mist, and then
suddenly it would clear away. Once, I remember,
it cleared at night, and one saw the full moon rising
through the pine trees into an utterly clear, ice-cold
sky, and under one’s feet the hard snow scrunched
and glittered in the moonlight. British, French
and Italian Batteries were all mixed together in this
sector. On our left came first another British
Battery, then two French, one in front of the road
and one behind it, then another British, then an Italian.
On our right, slightly more forward, the Headquarters
of an Italian Heavy Artillery Group, in front of them
a British and an Italian Battery, one on each side
of the road leading past Kaberlaba to the front line.
To the right of the Italian Headquarters, across the
San Sisto road, was a French Battery, with two Italian
Batteries in front of it. To our own right rear
was one Italian Battery and two French, and in rear
of them, back along the road to Granezza, our own Brigade
Headquarters.
This mixture was a good arrangement,
stimulating friendly rivalry and facilitating liaison
and exchange of ideas. Our relations were specially
cordial with the Italian-Group Headquarters and with
one of the French Batteries on our left. The
Italian Major commanding this Group was a Mantuan
and he and I became firm friends. It was in his
Mess one night, in reply to the toast of the Allies,
that I made my first after-dinner speech in Italian.
I do not claim that it was grammatically perfect,
but all that I said was, I think, well understood,
and I was in no hesitation for words.
Not till the end of May did Spring
really climb the mountains, and the snow finally vanish,
and then the days, apart from the facts of war, were
perfect, blue sky and sunshine all day long among the
warm aromatic pines and the freshness of the mountain
air. Here and there, in clearings in the forest,
were patches of thick, rich grass, making a bright
contrast to the dull, dark green of the pines, and
in the grass arose many-coloured wild flowers.
The Italians have buried their dead
up here in little groups among the trees, and not
in great graveyards. There was one such little
group on the hillside in the middle of our Battery
position, between two of our gunpits. There was
another in the middle of our forward position at San
Sisto, and another, where some thirty Bersaglieri and
Artillerymen were buried, in the Baerenthal Valley.
It was here one day that an Irish Major, newly come
to Italy, said to me, “I don’t want any
better grave than that.” Nor did I. It
was a place of marvellous and eternal beauty, ever
changing with the seasons. It made one’s
heart ache to be in the midst of it. It was hither
that they brought in the months that followed many
of the British dead, who fell in this sector, and laid
them beside the Italians, at whose graves we had looked
that day.