JOHNSTON’S MOVEMENTS - FORTIFICATIONS AT HAINES’ BLUFF - EXPLOSION OF THE MINE - EXPLOSION OF THE SECOND MINE - PREPARING FOR THE ASSAULT - THE FLAG OF TRUCE - MEETING WITH PEMBERTON - NEGOTIATIONS FOR SURRENDER - ACCEPTING THE TERMS - SURRENDER OF VICKSBURG.

On the 22d of June positive information was received that Johnston had crossed the Big Black River for the purpose of attacking our rear, to raise the siege and release Pemberton.  The correspondence between Johnston and Pemberton shows that all expectation of holding Vicksburg had by this time passed from Johnston’s mind.  I immediately ordered Sherman to the command of all the forces from Haines’ Bluff to the Big Black River.  This amounted now to quite half the troops about Vicksburg.  Besides these, Herron and A. J. Smith’s divisions were ordered to hold themselves in readiness to reinforce Sherman.  Haines’ Bluff had been strongly fortified on the land side, and on all commanding points from there to the Big Black at the railroad crossing batteries had been constructed.  The work of connecting by rifle-pits where this was not already done, was an easy task for the troops that were to defend them.

We were now looking west, besieging Pemberton, while we were also looking east to defend ourselves against an expected siege by Johnston.  But as against the garrison of Vicksburg we were as substantially protected as they were against us.  Where we were looking east and north we were strongly fortified, and on the defensive.  Johnston evidently took in the situation and wisely, I think, abstained from making an assault on us because it would simply have inflicted loss on both sides without accomplishing any result.  We were strong enough to have taken the offensive against him; but I did not feel disposed to take any risk of losing our hold upon Pemberton’s army, while I would have rejoiced at the opportunity of defending ourselves against an attack by Johnston.

From the 23d of May the work of fortifying and pushing forward our position nearer to the enemy had been steadily progressing.  At three points on the Jackson road, in front of Leggett’s brigade, a sap was run up to the enemy’s parapet, and by the 25th of June we had it undermined and the mine charged.  The enemy had countermined, but did not succeed in reaching our mine.  At this particular point the hill on which the rebel work stands rises abruptly.  Our sap ran close up to the outside of the enemy’s parapet.  In fact this parapet was also our protection.  The soldiers of the two sides occasionally conversed pleasantly across this barrier; sometimes they exchanged the hard bread of the Union soldiers for the tobacco of the Confederates; at other times the enemy threw over hand-grenades, and often our men, catching them in their hands, returned them.

Our mine had been started some distance back down the hill; consequently when it had extended as far as the parapet it was many feet below it.  This caused the failure of the enemy in his search to find and destroy it.  On the 25th of June at three o’clock, all being ready, the mine was exploded.  A heavy artillery fire all along the line had been ordered to open with the explosion.  The effect was to blow the top of the hill off and make a crater where it stood.  The breach was not sufficient to enable us to pass a column of attack through.  In fact, the enemy having failed to reach our mine had thrown up a line farther back, where most of the men guarding that point were placed.  There were a few men, however, left at the advance line, and others working in the countermine, which was still being pushed to find ours.  All that were there were thrown into the air, some of them coming down on our side, still alive.  I remember one colored man, who had been under ground at work when the explosion took place, who was thrown to our side.  He was not much hurt, but terribly frightened.  Some one asked him how high he had gone up.  “Dun no, massa, but t’ink ’bout t’ree mile,” was his reply.  General Logan commanded at this point and took this colored man to his quarters, where he did service to the end of the siege.

As soon as the explosion took place the crater was seized by two regiments of our troops who were near by, under cover, where they had been placed for the express purpose.  The enemy made a desperate effort to expel them, but failed, and soon retired behind the new line.  From here, however, they threw hand-grenades, which did some execution.  The compliment was returned by our men, but not with so much effect.  The enemy could lay their grenades on the parapet, which alone divided the contestants, and roll them down upon us; while from our side they had to be thrown over the parapet, which was at considerable elevation.  During the night we made efforts to secure our position in the crater against the missiles of the enemy, so as to run trenches along the outer base of their parapet, right and left; but the enemy continued throwing their grenades, and brought boxes of field ammunition (shells), the fuses of which they would light with portfires, and throw them by hand into our ranks.  We found it impossible to continue this work.  Another mine was consequently started which was exploded on the 1st of July, destroying an entire rebel redan, killing and wounding a considerable number of its occupants and leaving an immense chasm where it stood.  No attempt to charge was made this time, the experience of the 25th admonishing us.  Our loss in the first affair was about thirty killed and wounded.  The enemy must have lost more in the two explosions than we did in the first.  We lost none in the second.

From this time forward the work of mining and pushing our position nearer to the enemy was prosecuted with vigor, and I determined to explode no more mines until we were ready to explode a number at different points and assault immediately after.  We were up now at three different points, one in front of each corps, to where only the parapet of the enemy divided us.

At this time an intercepted dispatch from Johnston to Pemberton informed me that Johnston intended to make a determined attack upon us in order to relieve the garrison at Vicksburg.  I knew the garrison would make no formidable effort to relieve itself.  The picket lines were so close to each other - where there was space enough between the lines to post pickets - that the men could converse.  On the 21st of June I was informed, through this means, that Pemberton was preparing to escape, by crossing to the Louisiana side under cover of night; that he had employed workmen in making boats for that purpose; that the men had been canvassed to ascertain if they would make an assault on the “Yankees” to cut their way out; that they had refused, and almost mutinied, because their commander would not surrender and relieve their sufferings, and had only been pacified by the assurance that boats enough would be finished in a week to carry them all over.  The rebel pickets also said that houses in the city had been pulled down to get material to build these boats with.  Afterwards this story was verified:  on entering the city we found a large number of very rudely constructed boats.

All necessary steps were at once taken to render such an attempt abortive.  Our pickets were doubled; Admiral Porter was notified, so that the river might be more closely watched; material was collected on the west bank of the river to be set on fire and light up the river if the attempt was made; and batteries were established along the levee crossing the peninsula on the Louisiana side.  Had the attempt been made the garrison of Vicksburg would have been drowned, or made prisoners on the Louisiana side.  General Richard Taylor was expected on the west bank to co-operate in this movement, I believe, but he did not come, nor could he have done so with a force sufficient to be of service.  The Mississippi was now in our possession from its source to its mouth, except in the immediate front of Vicksburg and of Port Hudson.  We had nearly exhausted the country, along a line drawn from Lake Providence to opposite Bruinsburg.  The roads west were not of a character to draw supplies over for any considerable force.

By the 1st of July our approaches had reached the enemy’s ditch at a number of places.  At ten points we could move under cover to within from five to one hundred yards of the enemy.  Orders were given to make all preparations for assault on the 6th of July.  The debouches were ordered widened to afford easy egress, while the approaches were also to be widened to admit the troops to pass through four abreast.  Plank, and bags filled with cotton packed in tightly, were ordered prepared, to enable the troops to cross the ditches.

On the night of the 1st of July Johnston was between Brownsville and the Big Black, and wrote Pemberton from there that about the 7th of the month an attempt would be made to create a diversion to enable him to cut his way out.  Pemberton was a prisoner before this message reached him.

On July 1st Pemberton, seeing no hope of outside relief, addressed the following letter to each of his four division commanders: 

“Unless the siege of Vicksburg is raised, or supplies are thrown in, it will become necessary very shortly to evacuate the place.  I see no prospect of the former, and there are many great, if not insuperable obstacles in the way of the latter.  You are, therefore, requested to inform me with as little delay as possible, as to the condition of your troops and their ability to make the marches and undergo the fatigues necessary to accomplish a successful evacuation.”

Two of his generals suggested surrender, and the other two practically did the same.  They expressed the opinion that an attempt to evacuate would fail.  Pemberton had previously got a message to Johnston suggesting that he should try to negotiate with me for a release of the garrison with their arms.  Johnston replied that it would be a confession of weakness for him to do so; but he authorized Pemberton to use his name in making such an arrangement.

On the 3d about ten o’clock A.M. white flags appeared on a portion of the rebel works.  Hostilities along that part of the line ceased at once.  Soon two persons were seen coming towards our lines bearing a white flag.  They proved to be General Bowen, a division commander, and Colonel Montgomery, aide-de-camp to Pemberton, bearing the following letter to me: 

“I have the honor to propose an armistice for - hours, with the view to arranging terms for the capitulation of Vicksburg.  To this end, if agreeable to you, I will appoint three commissioners, to meet a like number to be named by yourself at such place and hour to-day as you may find convenient.  I make this proposition to save the further effusion of blood, which must otherwise be shed to a frightful extent, feeling myself fully able to maintain my position for a yet indefinite period.  This communication will be handed you under a flag of truce, by Major-General John S. Bowen.”

It was a glorious sight to officers and soldiers on the line where these white flags were visible, and the news soon spread to all parts of the command.  The troops felt that their long and weary marches, hard fighting, ceaseless watching by night and day, in a hot climate, exposure to all sorts of weather, to diseases and, worst of all, to the gibes of many Northern papers that came to them saying all their suffering was in vain, that Vicksburg would never be taken, were at last at an end and the Union sure to be saved.

Bowen was received by General A. J. Smith, and asked to see me.  I had been a neighbor of Bowen’s in Missouri, and knew him well and favorably before the war; but his request was refused.  He then suggested that I should meet Pemberton.  To this I sent a verbal message saying that, if Pemberton desired it, I would meet him in front of McPherson’s corps at three o’clock that afternoon.  I also sent the following written reply to Pemberton’s letter: 

“Your note of this date is just received, proposing an armistice for several hours, for the purpose of arranging terms of capitulation through commissioners, to be appointed, etc.  The useless effusion of blood you propose stopping by this course can be ended at any time you may choose, by the unconditional surrender of the city and garrison.  Men who have shown so much endurance and courage as those now in Vicksburg, will always challenge the respect of an adversary, and I can assure you will be treated with all the respect due to prisoners of war.  I do not favor the proposition of appointing commissioners to arrange the terms of capitulation, because I have no terms other than those indicated above.”

At three o’clock Pemberton appeared at the point suggested in my verbal message, accompanied by the same officers who had borne his letter of the morning.  Generals Ord, McPherson, Logan and A. J. Smith, and several officers of my staff, accompanied me.  Our place of meeting was on a hillside within a few hundred feet of the rebel lines.  Near by stood a stunted oak-tree, which was made historical by the event.  It was but a short time before the last vestige of its body, root and limb had disappeared, the fragments taken as trophies.  Since then the same tree has furnished as many cords of wood, in the shape of trophies, as “The True Cross.”

Pemberton and I had served in the same division during part of the Mexican War.  I knew him very well therefore, and greeted him as an old acquaintance.  He soon asked what terms I proposed to give his army if it surrendered.  My answer was the same as proposed in my reply to his letter.  Pemberton then said, rather snappishly, “The conference might as well end,” and turned abruptly as if to leave.  I said, “Very well.”  General Bowen, I saw, was very anxious that the surrender should be consummated.  His manner and remarks while Pemberton and I were talking, showed this.  He now proposed that he and one of our generals should have a conference.  I had no objection to this, as nothing could be made binding upon me that they might propose.  Smith and Bowen accordingly had a conference, during which Pemberton and I, moving a short distance away towards the enemy’s lines were in conversation.  After a while Bowen suggested that the Confederate army should be allowed to march out with the honors of war, carrying their small arms and field artillery.  This was promptly and unceremoniously rejected.  The interview here ended, I agreeing, however, to send a letter giving final terms by ten o’clock that night.

Word was sent to Admiral Porter soon after the correspondence with Pemberton commenced, so that hostilities might be stopped on the part of both army and navy.  It was agreed on my paging with Pemberton that they should not be renewed until our correspondence ceased.

When I returned to my headquarters I sent for all the corps and division commanders with the army immediately confronting Vicksburg.  Half the army was from eight to twelve miles off, waiting for Johnston.  I informed them of the contents of Pemberton’s letters, of my reply and the substance of the interview, and that I was ready to hear any suggestion; but would hold the power of deciding entirely in my own hands.  This was the nearest approach to a “council of war” I ever held.  Against the general, and almost unanimous judgment of the council I sent the following letter: 

“In conformity with agreement of this afternoon, I will submit the following proposition for the surrender of the City of Vicksburg, public stores, etc.  On your accepting the terms proposed, I will march in one division as a guard, and take possession at eight A.M. to-morrow.  As soon as rolls can be made out, and paroles be signed by officers and men, you will be allowed to march out of our lines, the officers taking with them their side-arms and clothing, and the field, staff and cavalry officers one horse each.  The rank and file will be allowed all their clothing, but no other property.  If these conditions are accepted, any amount of rations you may deem necessary can be taken from the stores you now have, and also the necessary cooking utensils for preparing them.  Thirty wagons also, counting two two-horse or mule teams as one, will be allowed to transport such articles as cannot be carried along.  The same conditions will be allowed to all sick and wounded officers and soldiers as fast as they become able to travel.  The paroles for these latter must be signed, however, whilst officers present are authorized to sign the roll of prisoners.”

By the terms of the cartel then in force, prisoners captured by either army were required to be forwarded as soon as possible to either Aiken’s landing below Dutch Gap on the James River, or to Vicksburg, there to be exchanged, or paroled until they could be exchanged.  There was a Confederate commissioner at Vicksburg, authorized to make the exchange.  I did not propose to take him a prisoner, but to leave him free to perform the functions of his office.  Had I insisted upon an unconditional surrender there would have been over thirty thousand men to transport to Cairo, very much to the inconvenience of the army on the Mississippi.  Thence the prisoners would have had to be transported by rail to Washington or Baltimore; thence again by steamer to Aiken’s - all at very great expense.  At Aiken’s they would have had to be paroled, because the Confederates did not have Union prisoners to give in exchange.  Then again Pemberton’s army was largely composed of men whose homes were in the South-west; I knew many of them were tired of the war and would get home just as soon as they could.  A large number of them had voluntarily come into our lines during the siege, and requested to be sent north where they could get employment until the war was over and they could go to their homes.

Late at night I received the following reply to my last letter: 

“I have the honor to acknowledge the receipt of your communication of this date, proposing terms of capitulation for this garrison and post.  In the main your terms are accepted; but, in justice both to the honor and spirit of my troops manifested in the defence of Vicksburg, I have to submit the following amendments, which, if acceded to by you, will perfect the agreement between us.  At ten o’clock A.M. to-morrow, I propose to evacuate the works in and around Vicksburg, and to surrender the city and garrison under my command, by marching out with my colors and arms, stacking them in front of my present lines.  After which you will take possession.  Officers to retain their side-arms and personal property, and the rights and property of citizens to be respected.”

This was received after midnight.  My reply was as follows: 

“I have the honor to acknowledge the receipt of your communication of 3d July.  The amendment proposed by you cannot be acceded to in full.  It will be necessary to furnish every officer and man with a parole signed by himself, which, with the completion of the roll of prisoners, will necessarily take some time.  Again, I can make no stipulations with regard to the treatment of citizens and their private property.  While I do not propose to cause them any undue annoyance or loss, I cannot consent to leave myself under any restraint by stipulations.  The property which officers will be allowed to take with them will be as stated in my proposition of last evening; that is, officers will be allowed their private baggage and side-arms, and mounted officers one horse each.  If you mean by your proposition for each brigade to march to the front of the lines now occupied by it, and stack arms at ten o’clock A.M., and then return to the inside and there remain as prisoners until properly paroled, I will make no objection to it.  Should no notification be received of your acceptance of my terms by nine o’clock A.M.  I shall regard them as having been rejected, and shall act accordingly.  Should these terms be accepted, white flags should be displayed along your lines to prevent such of my troops as may not have been notified, from firing upon your men.”

Pemberton promptly accepted these terms.

During the siege there had been a good deal of friendly sparring between the soldiers of the two armies, on picket and where the lines were close together.  All rebels were known as “Johnnies,” all Union troops as “Yanks.”  Often “Johnny” would call:  “Well, Yank, when are you coming into town?” The reply was sometimes:  “We propose to celebrate the 4th of July there.”  Sometimes it would be:  “We always treat our prisoners with kindness and do not want to hurt them;” or, “We are holding you as prisoners of war while you are feeding yourselves.”  The garrison, from the commanding general down, undoubtedly expected an assault on the fourth.  They knew from the temper of their men it would be successful when made; and that would be a greater humiliation than to surrender.  Besides it would be attended with severe loss to them.

The Vicksburg paper, which we received regularly through the courtesy of the rebel pickets, said prior to the fourth, in speaking of the “Yankee” boast that they would take dinner in Vicksburg that day, that the best receipt for cooking a rabbit was “First ketch your rabbit.”  The paper at this time and for some time previous was printed on the plain side of wall paper.  The last number was issued on the fourth and announced that we had “caught our rabbit.”

I have no doubt that Pemberton commenced his correspondence on the third with a two-fold purpose:  first, to avoid an assault, which he knew would be successful, and second, to prevent the capture taking place on the great national holiday, the anniversary of the Declaration of American Independence.  Holding out for better terms as he did he defeated his aim in the latter particular.

At the appointed hour the garrison of Vicksburg marched out of their works and formed line in front, stacked arms and marched back in good order.  Our whole army present witnessed this scene without cheering.  Logan’s division, which had approached nearest the rebel works, was the first to march in; and the flag of one of the regiments of his division was soon floating over the court-house.  Our soldiers were no sooner inside the lines than the two armies began to fraternize.  Our men had had full rations from the time the siege commenced, to the close.  The enemy had been suffering, particularly towards the last.  I myself saw our men taking bread from their haversacks and giving it to the enemy they had so recently been engaged in starving out.  It was accepted with avidity and with thanks.

Pemberton says in his report: 

“If it should be asked why the 4th of July was selected as the day for surrender, the answer is obvious.  I believed that upon that day I should obtain better terms.  Well aware of the vanity of our foe, I knew they would attach vast importance to the entrance on the 4th of July into the stronghold of the great river, and that, to gratify their national vanity, they would yield then what could not be extorted from them at any other time.”

This does not support my view of his reasons for selecting the day he did for surrendering.  But it must be recollected that his first letter asking terms was received about 10 o’clock A.M., July 3d.  It then could hardly be expected that it would take twenty-four hours to effect a surrender.  He knew that Johnston was in our rear for the purpose of raising the siege, and he naturally would want to hold out as long as he could.  He knew his men would not resist an assault, and one was expected on the fourth.  In our interview he told me he had rations enough to hold out for some time - my recollection is two weeks.  It was this statement that induced me to insert in the terms that he was to draw rations for his men from his own supplies.

On the 4th of July General Holmes, with an army of eight or nine thousand men belonging to the trans-Mississippi department, made an attack upon Helena, Arkansas.  He was totally defeated by General Prentiss, who was holding Helena with less than forty-two hundred soldiers.  Holmes reported his loss at 1,636, of which 173 were killed; but as Prentiss buried 400, Holmes evidently understated his losses.  The Union loss was 57 killed, 127 wounded, and between 30 and 40 missing.  This was the last effort on the part of the Confederacy to raise the siege of Vicksburg.

On the third, as soon as negotiations were commenced, I notified Sherman and directed him to be ready to take the offensive against Johnston, drive him out of the State and destroy his army if he could.  Steele and Ord were directed at the same time to be in readiness to join Sherman as soon as the surrender took place.  Of this Sherman was notified.

I rode into Vicksburg with the troops, and went to the river to exchange congratulations with the navy upon our joint victory.  At that time I found that many of the citizens had been living under ground.  The ridges upon which Vicksburg is built, and those back to the Big Black, are composed of a deep yellow clay of great tenacity.  Where roads and streets are cut through, perpendicular banks are left and stand as well as if composed of stone.  The magazines of the enemy were made by running passage-ways into this clay at places where there were deep cuts.  Many citizens secured places of safety for their families by carving out rooms in these embankments.  A door-way in these cases would be cut in a high bank, starting from the level of the road or street, and after running in a few feet a room of the size required was carved out of the clay, the dirt being removed by the door-way.  In some instances I saw where two rooms were cut out, for a single family, with a door-way in the clay wall separating them.  Some of these were carpeted and furnished with considerable elaboration.  In these the occupants were fully secure from the shells of the navy, which were dropped into the city night and dav without intermission.

I returned to my old headquarters outside in the afternoon, and did not move into the town until the sixth.  On the afternoon of the fourth I sent Captain Wm. M. Dunn of my staff to Cairo, the nearest point where the telegraph could be reached, with a dispatch to the general-in-chief.  It was as follows: 

“The enemy surrendered this morning.  The only terms allowed is their parole as prisoners of war.  This I regard as a great advantage to us at this moment.  It saves, probably, several days in the capture, and leaves troops and transports ready for immediate service.  Sherman, with a large force, moves immediately on Johnston, to drive him from the State.  I will send troops to the relief of Banks, and return the 9th army corps to Burnside.”

This news, with the victory at Gettysburg won the same day, lifted a great load of anxiety from the minds of the President, his Cabinet and the loyal people all over the North.  The fate of the Confederacy was sealed when Vicksburg fell.  Much hard fighting was to be done afterwards and many precious lives were to be sacrificed; but the MORALE was with the supporters of the Union ever after.

I at the same time wrote to General Banks informing him of the fall and sending him a copy of the terms; also saying I would send him all the troops he wanted to insure the capture of the only foothold the enemy now had on the Mississippi River.  General Banks had a number of copies of this letter printed, or at least a synopsis of it, and very soon a copy fell into the hands of General Gardner, who was then in command of Port Hudson.  Gardner at once sent a letter to the commander of the National forces saying that he had been informed of the surrender of Vicksburg and telling how the information reached him.  He added that if this was true, it was useless for him to hold out longer.  General Banks gave him assurances that Vicksburg had been surrendered, and General Gardner surrendered unconditionally on the 9th of July.  Port Hudson with nearly 6,000 prisoners, 51 guns, 5,000 small-arms and other stores fell into the hands of the Union forces:  from that day to the close of the rebellion the Mississippi River, from its source to its mouth, remained in the control of the National troops.

Pemberton and his army were kept in Vicksburg until the whole could be paroled.  The paroles were in duplicate, by organization (one copy for each, Federals and Confederates), and signed by the commanding officers of the companies or regiments.  Duplicates were also made for each soldier and signed by each individually, one to be retained by the soldier signing and one to be retained by us.  Several hundred refused to sign their paroles, preferring to be sent to the North as prisoners to being sent back to fight again.  Others again kept out of the way, hoping to escape either alternative.

Pemberton appealed to me in person to compel these men to sign their paroles, but I declined.  It also leaked out that many of the men who had signed their paroles, intended to desert and go to their homes as soon as they got out of our lines.  Pemberton hearing this, again appealed to me to assist him.  He wanted arms for a battalion, to act as guards in keeping his men together while being marched to a camp of instruction, where he expected to keep them until exchanged.  This request was also declined.  It was precisely what I expected and hoped that they would do.  I told him, however, that I would see that they marched beyond our lines in good order.  By the eleventh, just one week after the surrender, the paroles were completed and the Confederate garrison marched out.  Many deserted, and fewer of them were ever returned to the ranks to fight again than would have been the case had the surrender been unconditional and the prisoners sent to the James River to be paroled.

As soon as our troops took possession of the city guards were established along the whole line of parapet, from the river above to the river below.  The prisoners were allowed to occupy their old camps behind the intrenchments.  No restraint was put upon them, except by their own commanders.  They were rationed about as our own men, and from our supplies.  The men of the two armies fraternized as if they had been fighting for the same cause.  When they passed out of the works they had so long and so gallantly defended, between lines of their late antagonists, not a cheer went up, not a remark was made that would give pain.  Really, I believe there was a feeling of sadness just then in the breasts of most of the Union soldiers at seeing the dejection of their late antagonists.

The day before the departure the following order was issued: 

“Paroled prisoners will be sent out of here to-morrow.  They will be authorized to cross at the railroad bridge, and move from there to Edward’s Ferry, (14) and on by way of Raymond.  Instruct the commands to be orderly and quiet as these prisoners pass, to make no offensive remarks, and not to harbor any who fall out of ranks after they have passed.”