THE SELECTION OF A CORRECT OBJECTIVE

(Including the Determination, in Proper Detail, of the Action Required for its Attainment)

The First Step The Solution of a Basic Problem (The Estimate of the Situation)

The procedure for solution of the type of problem distinctive of the first step is that already indicated as applicable to all military problems, i.e., a specialized employment of the natural mental processes through the application of the Fundamental Military Principle. The studied application of the Principle is assisted through the Estimate Form which provides a more detailed guide.

The fundamentals of the Estimate Form have already been discussed. Except for emphasis, or to afford a basis for further detailed discussion, the basic matters previously dealt with are not repeated in the present chapter. It is therefore advisable, before studying the details applicable to the first step, to make an adequate review of the pertinent portions of the preceding chapter. With the necessary background thus provided, the Estimate Form can be followed with a minimum of distraction caused by reference to related subjects.

For special emphasis, it is repeated here that the Estimate Form is a flexible guide. The commander is of course at liberty to vary the procedure according to his particular needs and the nature of his problem; however, he will bear in mind that errors of commission or of omission arising by reason of departure from the essential features of the procedure may disrupt orderly reasoning.

The Estimate Form is divided into sections and sub-sections, each of which presents a subject for consideration. The Form follows, sequentially, the salient features of the natural mental process. It will be seen, from an examination of the section headings listed below, that Section I has to do with establishing the basis for solution of the problem; Sections ii, iii, and iv relate to the actual process of solution through consideration of various courses of action; while Section V states the conclusion reached.

I. Establishment of the Basis for Solution of the Problem.

II. Determination of Suitable, Feasible, and Acceptable Courses of Action.

III. Examination into the Capabilities of the Enemy.

IV. Selection of the Best Course of Action.

V. The Decision.

A tabular form inserted in the Appendix lists the foregoing headings and their principal subdivisions within the Estimate Form. For convenience, the appended Form also includes page references to the discussion in this chapter.

SECTION I: ESTABLISHMENT OF THE BASIS FOR SOLUTION OF THE PROBLEM

As noted in the Fundamental Military Principle, each objective, prior to its selection, and each operation, prior to its adoption, requires examination from the standpoint of suitability, feasibility, and acceptability. Suitability involves the factor of the appropriate effect desired; feasibility involves the factors of the means available and opposed, as influenced by the characteristics of the theater; and acceptability involves the factor of the consequences as to costs.

In order to establish a sound basis for the solution of a military problem, one which will permit the tests for suitability, feasibility, and acceptability to be intelligently applied, it is necessary that the factors involved be studied.

A. The Appropriate Effect Desired.

The appropriate effect desired, the first factor listed, is the goal toward which the commander is working. He is enabled to form an understanding of this essential aspect of his problem through (1) a grasp of the salient features of the situation, (2) a recognition of the incentive to solution, and (3) an appreciation of the assigned objective. He expresses this understanding by (4) formulating the mission.

The sequence in which the commander takes up these considerations is a matter for his own choice. Usually, directives from higher authority give him, first, information as to the situation; thereafter, such directives assign him a task (or tasks) involving one or more assigned objectives. For this reason, the sequence so indicated is the one utilized here.

(1) Summary of the Situation. Before the commander can decide whether he wishes to maintain the existing situation or to change it, he requires a mental picture of its salient features. On beginning the Estimate, the available information is therefore briefly summarized. The picture presented here will show in broad outline the opposing forces as disposed in localities which constitute relative positions with reference to each other. Details are reserved for Section I-B of the Estimate.

The appropriate data are noted on the chart, and study of the chart goes hand in hand with the development of the Estimate.

The summary of the situation may include statements as to present activities of own and enemy forces. It may recite significant occurrences. It does not attempt to compare or to deduce; such processes are deferred until Section I-B. The commander extracts, from the information furnished by higher authority, such data as are pertinent to his own problem. He includes these data in his own summary, supplementing them by information from other sources, to the extent deemed advisable. In the exercise of judgment as to the content of his summary, the commander is influenced by the fact that the summary is the point of departure for visualizing the appropriate effect desired.

(2) Recognition of the Incentive. In basic problems, the commander finds his incentive in directives received from higher authority. Under the procedure of the Estimate, a notation of that fact, with a citation of the directive(s), is all that is required to indicate that the commander has formed a proper recognition of his incentive.

(3) Appreciation of the Assigned Objective. A correct understanding of the nature and of the involvements of the assigned objective is, naturally, an essential to the establishment of the basis for the solution of a problem of the first step.

At this stage of the Estimate the commander cannot, however, expect always to reach a final conclusion as to this matter. He will have opportunity for further consideration. It will be realized that, after intervening portions of the Estimate have been worked out, the commander will be in a position to examine the assigned objective again, and to make a more thorough analysis.

In a basic problem, the commander is assigned his objective by higher authority, usually in the form of an assigned task. Although, such task may be expressed by one of various methods, a properly conceived task always indicates, either specifically or inferentially, an objective (or objectives).

Whatever method of expression may have been employed by higher authority, the commander will facilitate his appreciation of the assigned objective if he now sets down his assigned task, scrutinizes it carefully, and then makes note of the objective which is either specifically or inferentially indicated by that task.

The commander’s basis for solving the problem is not complete, however, with merely a statement of his own objective. Full visualization of the effect desired is not obtained until the commander appreciates not only the result which he, himself, is required to accomplish, but also the next further result which is expected to eventuate as, at least in part, an effect of his accomplishment. His goal, as an “effect desired”, includes not only the effect desired of him by higher authority, but also the effect which his immediate superior desires to be accomplished by that superior’s entire force.

Occasionally, full appreciation of the commander’s objective will require, also, consideration of the further effects desired by yet higher successive echelons.

The natural requirement is that the goal be so clearly defined as to obviate any material doubt as to the implications involved in the commander’s assigned objective. When the goal has been thus defined, there results a linking of effect and further effect, of objective and further objective, in short, of task and purpose, the importance of which has previously been emphasized.

In making notation of this further objective for the solution of problems typical of the first step, the commander normally sets down the general plan of his immediate superior for the employment of the latter’s entire force. When the linking of objective to objective, echelon by echelon, has involved no complication, the immediate superior’s general plan will be a sufficient indication of the purpose for which the commander is to carry out his task.

(4) Formulation of the Mission.

The linking of the commander’s assigned task to the general plan of his immediate superior permits the commander to formulate his mission. His assigned task becomes the task of his mission; his superior’s general plan becomes the purpose of his mission. In this manner he crystallizes into a clear statement the part of the common effort which he is to carry out, indicating the assigned objective he is himself to attain, as well as the further objective to whose attainment his effort is to contribute.

In establishing the basis for solution of his problem with respect to suitability, the commander may have considered his assigned objective before studying his situation. If so, he may now desire to modify his earlier statement of that objective, before incorporating it in the formulation of his mission, to the end that a more clear-cut and concise expression may be obtained.

The relationship is expressed in the following;

My assigned task is to be accomplished for the purpose of carrying out my designated part of my superior’s general plan.

This formula is customarily simplified to the following:

(Task) (statement of the assigned task),

(Purpose) in order to assist in the successful execution of (statement of the superior’s general plan).

The words “assist in the successful execution of” may frequently be understood and therefore omitted.

The mission, thus formulated, clearly indicates the appropriate effect desired, i.e., the factor which establishes the basis for the solution of the problem from the standpoint of suitability.

B. Relative Fighting Strength.

As indicated in the Fundamental Military Principle, the second and third requirements for a sound solution of the problem are feasibility of accomplishment and acceptability of the consequences as to costs.

Both requirements have to do with the factors of relative fighting strength. Fighting strength is derived from the means available as influenced by the characteristics of the theater. Relative fighting strength is determined by a weighing of these factors against the means opposed, as influenced also by the characteristics of the theater.

These are the factors, then, which are next studied in the Estimate. They are studied in order to complete the establishment of the basis for the solution of the problem.

The factor of consequences, as listed in the Fundamental Military Principle, is related to the factors pertinent to feasibility. This is true because consequences are assessed, in the Estimate, on the basis of the envisaged results of proposed actions. These results are necessarily predicated on the grounds established by consideration of the factors of relative fighting strength. The study of relative fighting strength thus provides not only a sound basis for the determination, later, of the feasibility of courses of action, but also of their acceptability with respect to consequences as to costs.

Particular emphasis is placed on the conclusion as to relative fighting strength, to the end that specific advantages may be ascertained. Such a study is primarily concerned with information: its collection, its analysis, its evaluation, and its interpretation so as to convert it into military (naval) intelligence, with a view to its use by the commander in the solution of his problem. Information as to forces present and as to their positions is of course prerequisite to a clear comprehension of the possibilities as to physical objectives, as to relative positions, as to apportionment of fighting strength, and as to freedom of action.

The commander may choose whether he shall, in his estimate, first consider the means available and opposed, or reverse the order and give priority to the characteristics of the theater. In a particular situation, the significance of these characteristics is frequently determined by the capabilities and limitations of the means available and opposed. For this reason, these means are first discussed in this treatment, which thereafter includes the analysis of the characteristics of the theater.

The capabilities and limitations of the means, and the significance of the characteristics of the theater, may be expressed in terms of certain specific factors. Each of these factors may influence, or be influenced by, any or all of the others. Situations occur in which certain factors exert little or no influence. Yet, in other situations, these same factors have a paramount effect.

The classification of factors utilized in the following treatment is applicable to most military problems.

A list of pertinent factors, to be of real use in the solution of problems, is required, first, to be complete, so that no factor will be overlooked, and, second, to be simple, so that, as far as practicable, all similar data may be discussed under one heading.

With respect to the factors set forth in succeeding pages, the solution of a particular problem may call for a different listing.

Such listing may involve, in some cases, the contraction or the omission of certain of the headings.

In other cases, an expansion will be necessary or desirable under certain headings, in considerably greater detail than shown here. For example, Section I-B of a National Estimate may involve reference to several volumes of printed books or of similar data, while, even in ordinary strategical situations, numerous charts, books of sailing directions, and other compilations may require study. Where such references are not standard and generally available, they may be appended, preferably in condensed form.

The proper listing of pertinent factors will depend on the nature of the problem.

(1) Survey of the Means Available and Opposed.

The application of power, actually or by threat, is dependent on the ability of the human and material components of fighting strength to develop energy and to exert effort for purposes of combat. These components, as ranged on one side or the other, constitute the means available and opposed. Analysis of these means requires a classification of the various factors which influence the situation.

For a broad strategical estimate made by the State, economic and political factors require intensive study; physical objectives, relative position, apportionment of fighting strength, and freedom of action are all involved in such a survey.

For a strategical estimate made by a high military commander, these factors frequently enter to a lesser extent. Such a commander is concerned only with the effect which these factors will have on the operations projected for the particular theater involved in his problem. From his point of view, the economic and political factors often have little bearing on the elements of a favorable military situation. In such a case, the commander concentrates in this section on the factors more directly relating to the armed forces; his important considerations deal with such matters as numerical strength, types of weapons, disposition, and factors as to freedom of action.

For strategical estimates of lesser scope, the commander further restricts his study accordingly.

In detailed tactical estimates the commander requires an exhaustive comprehension of the fighting capabilities of his own and the enemy armed forces, because his selection of physical objectives and his use of relative position are affected by such considerations. This is manifestly true for studied tactical estimates made in advance to meet contingencies, but its import is not always fully understood in its bearing on the unfolding situation after the battle begins. At that time, the most precise knowledge is called for, under the then rapidly changing conditions.

In the Form treated herein, those matters particularly applicable to broad estimates are included under “general factors”. These are followed by the factors more directly applicable to the armed forces.

(a) General Factors. (i) Political Factors. The prosecution of the war is directly influenced by such internal conditions as the strength of the national government and its capacity for unified effort, the moulding and maintaining of a firm public opinion in support of war aims, the neutralization of subversive propaganda, and the degree to which the government can make available necessary resources, both domestic and foreign.

External relations modify the conduct of war, always affecting broad estimates of the employment of national forces. The wartime factors which influence these relations include the effect of the clash between foreign opinion and national policy, the national bias of interested neutrals and of unneutral non-belligerent governments, and the normal attitude of such neutrals and non-belligerents toward each belligerent. The diplomatic skill of the opposing governments and the ability of propaganda to sway public opinion abroad may well determine the manner in which neutrality will be enforced.

Alliances, including those that are known and those that are secret, directly influence an estimate. When a war of any importance breaks out in any part of the world, all States are affected to some degree. One may have an alliance which, though not requiring active participation in the war, will call for collaboration with the efforts of a belligerent. Another alliance may require active participation, while still another State may attempt to maintain strict neutrality. Every State remaining at peace will thus be in a status ranging from that of a non-belligerent, with more or less close ties to one of the contestants, to a position of strict impartiality. The estimate of the international situation becomes more complex as the magnitude of the war increases. A correct appreciation of the status of each State concerned is of first importance in any broad estimate of the conduct of war.

(ii) Economic Factors. The capacity, organization, and mobilization of industry influence the rapidity and adequacy with which material is prepared for, and supplied to, the armed forces. The acceptance by the civilian population of sacrifices, caused by the diversion to war uses of the productive capacity of industry, will have a direct bearing upon the industrial capacity of that State.

The ability and willingness to finance the war effort, which includes the ability to tax, to float internal loans, and to create foreign credits, may well determine the extent and duration of the national capability for war.

The dependence of a nation upon the continuation of foreign trade, including the necessity of obtaining new markets and new sources of supply, affects its strength. No State yet has complete autarchy. Thus, there is the necessity of obtaining from foreign sources certain of the raw materials which are indispensable to the war effort. As each belligerent may endeavor to deny sources of raw materials to the other, a portion of the fighting power may be required for trade protection.

(iii) Psychological Factors. The maintenance of a stable morale at a high level is a primary concern. Such stability inures the nation or command against the full effects of surprise, fear, disappointment, despondency, and other weakening moral influences, while at the same time taking full advantage of those influences which strengthen the moral fiber of a people.

Training and experience influence morale, playing a part difficult to overestimate. They provide a basis for evaluating discipline. A study of the history of the State may prove valuable in estimating the present condition in this respect; a nation or command which may be classed as a veteran has an advantage over a beginner at the art of war.

Another important factor relates to the existence of the skills necessary for the production and use of the material means of war. The control of skilled personnel is a psychological consideration of great importance.

Unity of effort, or the lack of it, especially between management and labor, may be one of the most important factors of the estimate.

Special attention is desirable as to national inventiveness and versatility in the production of new and surprising means of war or in development of methods that in any way contribute to a successful war effort.

Racial or national characteristics may affect the estimates of morale and training. Reactions of various races or groups to the conditions of war have been sufficiently recorded, on the basis of past performance, to prove of some value. Service traditions may furnish clues for correct evaluation of psychological factors.

While only the physical elements of fighting strength are susceptible of quantitative comparison, failure to take account of mental and moral factors may involve serious error. Nevertheless, in many situations, such factors remain relatively indeterminate until subjected to test. Inferences may be drawn, and deductions made, on a basis of peace-time observation and of historical precedent. In these, racial and national characteristics may figure prominently. History, however, has taught that, in a conflict between modern industrial and military nations, it is unwise to entertain any assumption other than that of moral equality until such time as the conflict has demonstrated the existence of a difference, and the degree thereof, or unless prior experience, observation, and acquaintance unquestionably warrant otherwise.

(iv) Information and counter-information measures. Operations of war are tremendously affected by the information which each belligerent possesses of the others. It is therefore of vital importance to weigh the efficiency of the belligerents in the employment of means of obtaining, denying, and utilizing information.

There may appropriately be considered present, probable, or possible use or non-use of indirect methods such as: study of press, captured documents, and material; reports from other friendly units; interrogation of prisoners of war, deserters, inhabitants, and escaped or exchanged prisoners; radio direction-finding; efficiency of cryptography; interception of enemy radio, telegraph, telephone, and mail communications; espionage; censorship; propaganda; efficiency of communications systems, ashore and afloat, which include all means of interchange of thought. In this connection it will be recalled that information, however accurate and appropriate, is useless if it cannot be conveyed in time.

The direct methods of obtaining information are military operations intended for that purpose, such as observation, reconnaissance, scouting, trailing.

Counter-information measures are no less important than those pertaining to collection of information. Such measures include all provisions for secrecy, such as censorship, counter-espionage, cryptography, control of own communications, security of documents, camouflage, and applicable tactical operations.

(b) Factors More Directly Applicable to Armed Forces, (i) Vessels, including aircraft. The numbers and characteristics, of the ships and aircraft of the various nations of the world are known with less and less accuracy from the time when war becomes a probability. The information available is given intense and comparative scrutiny, under the specific headings of the factors of the Estimate Form as later enumerated.

(ii) Land forces, including land-based aviation. Important facts concerning the land forces of the enemy, including his land-based aviation, will be known, probably, to a lesser extent than in the case of the naval forces. The value of a comparison naval, land, or air may depend upon whether the intelligence service has improved the accuracy of these data, maintained them up to date, and collected accurate additional information.

(iii) Personnel. The status of enemy personnel as to the sufficiency of numbers effectively to man all implements, as to training, morale, skill, stamina, and willingness to accept the supreme sacrifice, can seldom be accurately known. Unless there is positive information to the contrary, the wise commander will assume in this respect that the status of the personnel available to his opponent is at least equal to that of his own command. Full consideration will be given to all known facts concerning own personnel, to the end that its worth in any proposed situation may be properly evaluated.

The basic discussion of the psychological factors is applicable here as to the respective armed forces. Personal characteristics of commanders, so far as known, deserve full study, since they have an important bearing on relative fighting strength. The military value of the various units and forces is a similar consideration. The present attitude and past actions of enemy commanders and of their commands, and the factor of racial, national, and service characteristics, may furnish clues for correct evaluation in this connection.

(iv) Material. The material characteristics of the commander’s own implements of war are generally known to him. The characteristics of enemy material can only be estimated from such data as have become available, but are not to be underestimated.

Material characteristics embrace armament, life, and mobility.

Armament relates to the caliber and number of guns, and to other weapons such as torpedoes, mines, depth-charges and aircraft (with their own weapons). It also includes chemical agents and other instrumentalities, together with the types, potentialities as to range, and the number or amount of each available, both for immediate use and as replacements. Ammunition supply is a factor here. In the evaluation of foreign armaments, sufficient data are often available to make a reasonable estimate, but care is desirable not to underestimate.

Life is the ability to withstand punishment; it is expressed in terms of standards which can be clearly visualized. For a vessel, life is the ability to absorb damage while carrying out its assigned task. In the absence of definite factual data, evaluation of the life of foreign vessels will sometimes prove difficult. Here, again, an underestimate is dangerous.

Mobility is capability of movement. It is compounded of the elements of speed, radius, and the ability to operate under imposed conditions of weather, visibility, hydrography, and other possible obstacles to certain and free movement. Mobility is one of the most important factors pertaining directly to relative position, to apportionment of fighting strength, and to freedom of action. Closely related factors are the organization, disposition, and methods of operation of the enemy, and of own forces. Accurate knowledge of these factors, before an operation, greatly enhances the possibilities of dealing effectively with the enemy.

The condition of the implements of war embraces such factors as the efficiency of motive machinery, the integrity of underwater compartments and other material construction, and physical endurance. The last applies not only to material, but also to living beings, and involves the ability to withstand the wasting effects of operations, whether due to fatigue, hardship, disease, worry, wounds, or other causes. Here again, it is obvious that the commander will often have only an imperfect idea of the condition of the enemy in this respect. His experience will lead him to form an accurate estimate of his own condition. Definitely, unless he has positive information to the contrary, he assumes that the condition of the enemy is no worse or better than his own.

(v) Logistics support is of primary concern to the commander. In the naval service, this is particularly true of the strategical estimate. While the factor may also have some bearing on a tactical estimate, logistics support will rarely change sufficiently, during a naval battle, to affect the outcome. This support exercises a dominant influence upon the fighting power of armed forces. It is concerned with the availability, adequacy, and supply of the following:

Material: items such as fuel, ammunition, weapons, aircraft, food, clothing, spare parts, repair materials, animals, and general supplies.

Personnel: military and civilian; number and quality of replacements.

Facilities: factors such as bases; manufacture and repair facilities, afloat and ashore; shelter; sanitation; hospitalization; recreation; transportation; education; counter-espionage; counter-propaganda.

The limitation imposed upon operations by logistics represents the final limit of a commander’s plan of action.

(2) Survey of the Characteristics of the Theater of Operations.

The characteristics of the theater of operations exert an influence, always important, sometimes paramount, upon the possibility of attaining the objective, and upon the strategical and tactical operations that may be employed.

At this point in his estimate the commander utilizes his charts, intelligence reports, and hydrographic publications to make a factual study of the theater. This study is not for the purpose, at this time, of drawing any conclusions as to possible courses of action, but to furnish data which will assist in consideration of later sections of the estimate. The study may be made under several important headings, as follows:

(a) Hydrography. A study of the hydrography will determine the depth of water, the existence of shoals, the presence of unusual currents, the rise and fall of the tides, the availability of channels, and other pertinent features. These are recorded for later use.

Shallow water may permit mining or may prevent the operation of submarines. On the other hand, the ability to mine in shallow water may be curtailed by strong currents or by the rise and fall of the tide. Again, the depth of water, the strength of currents, and the range of the tide may determine the feasibility of netting the entrance to a port or base. In a tactical action, advantage may be taken of shoals to limit the freedom of action of the enemy, without, however, interfering with that of one’s own forces.

(b) Topography. The topography of the area is also frequently of interest to the naval commander. In actions close to the shore, the character of the coast may play an important role. A high bluff, combined with considerations as to light, may create a very definite advantage or disadvantage in a naval tactical situation.

Topography may be a most important consideration in determining what bases are to be used. The commander makes note of the topography of the various possible bases; later in his estimate, the natural features lending assistance to the defense of the various sites may play an important part in the selection of bases.

The use of channels may depend upon the topography of the bordering land. Questions arise as to whether such land can be seized and held, or, if in friendly hands, whether it can afford adequate protection to the channel.

In any landing operation, the topography of the area to be occupied may be the controlling factor.

(c) Weather. The seasonal weather in the theater will have a direct bearing upon operations. The use of aircraft, the employment of light forces, the habitability of ships over long periods, the use of smoke, the range at which a gun action may be fought, the effect of spray and gases, these considerations are but some of the matters which will be affected by weather.

The possession of, and the position of, meteorological stations within the theater are of growing importance in the successful planning of coordinated air, submarine, and surface operations.

(d) Daylight and Dark Periods. It may be well under this heading to put in tabular form the times of sunrise, sunset, moonrise, moonset, the phases of the moon, and the duration of morning and evening twilight. When, for example, the commander is considering night destroyer attacks, the operation of submarines, or the type of protective screens he desires to use, he may profitably refer to these tabulations.

(e) Relative Location and Distance. No part of the study of the characteristics of the theater is of greater importance than that pertaining to relative location and distance. At this point it may be found advantageous to place in tabular form the distances between the important positions within the geographical area of the theater. This study furnishes knowledge as to the availability of certain localities for use in support of, or in cooperation with, forces at other localities, and as to distances in relation to steaming capabilities of the various units which make up the commander’s force.

(f) Lines of Transportation and Supply. The usual sea routes which pass through the theater are an important subject of study; also, particular focal points, defiles, and restricted waters which are, or may prove to be, critical areas with respect to own or enemy forces. Other items are the significant routes from home or enemy territory, i.e., the lines of communication, the terminal points, and the flanking positions along these lines.

(g) Facilities and Fortifications. The facilities for the support, upkeep, and repair of the units of the commander’s forces and of the opposing force, as well as the fortifications existing within the area, may require consideration. Other features which may render a port or base of value, or which may indicate a possible necessity of denying it to the enemy, also merit attention.

(h) Communications. In strategical estimates, more particularly in broad ones covering large theaters, study of communications involves not only those means under the commander’s control, but also his relation to the system of regional and national communications operated by his government. Examination is made into the established physical stations; such examination includes radio, cables, and perhaps land wires.

In tactical estimates the means of communication which affect the engagement are more directly those under the control of the commander. An examination into the organization of the means to meet conditions prevailing in the theater is appropriate here.

Another aspect of communications is that of maintaining all forms against enemy interference. The importance of this feature in planning may not safely be overlooked, and careful study is indicated to provide for guaranteeing communications during action. The characteristics of the theater, as they relate to this feature, are considered here.

For the same reason, consideration of interference with enemy communications is included, so far as significance attaches to them with respect to the theater of operations.

This portion of the Estimate Form varies greatly with the type of problem under consideration. However, in all estimates, this is the place where the commander searches the theater for factors affecting communications for the particular problem.

With the completion of this subsection of the estimate, the commander has assembled and placed in workable form the information to which he expects to refer in the succeeding parts of the estimate.

(3) Conclusions as to Relative Fighting Strength.

Having surveyed the means available and opposed, as well as the characteristics of the theater of operations, the commander will find it useful to summarize the pertinent information available, in order that the strength and weakness of own and enemy forces can be readily visualized and compared. Thus the existing advantages and disadvantages are made apparent, and conclusions are drawn as to relative fighting strength.

A satisfactory procedure is to place strength and weakness factors in parallel columns for own and enemy forces. From careful consideration of the facts so far determined in Section I-B, there are extracted and expressed briefly the pertinent strength and weakness factors.

It is usually easier to determine all the strength and weakness factors in detailed tactical estimates than in broad strategical estimates.

The former deal in relatively more factual terms, with definite comparisons such as with respect to maximum speeds, numbers and caliber of guns, numbers and types of aircraft, numbers and types of torpedoes, and other such items which give the factual basis for comparison.

In broad strategical estimates, this factual basis is present, e.g., as to distances, radii of ships, geographical locations of forces, and the like. But other factors may not be so definite, especially as regards enemy forces. For example, it will often be difficult for the commander to say that the enemy’s logistics problem is easier or more difficult than his own, unless he has a good idea of the amount of fuel, ammunition, and stores available to the enemy within the time limits involved. The evaluation of training, spirit, health, and courage of personnel is, as previously noted, relatively easy to determine for own forces, but more or less of a conjecture in regard to the enemy.

The value of the entries in the parallel columns at this point of the estimate will depend upon the skill of the commander in judging the factual data contained in all of the known factors of strength and weakness. The proper entries to be made will depend upon circumstances. In one estimate, for example, the anti-aircraft armament available to a carrier group will be of vital importance. In another estimate of the same carrier group, anti-aircraft defense will be of no importance because no enemy aircraft can be employed in the situation being estimated. Again, in a local tactical situation, if the ships involved have just been fueled, the economical steaming radius may be of no immediate importance. And while the total amount of high-test gasoline which can be produced in a State in the coming year may be vital to a broad strategical estimate involving war against trade, that information may be of little use in a tactical estimate of a localized, fleeting situation.

Thus, in determining what factors to evaluate, and in assessing their relative value, the commander considers only such as can possibly affect the effort to be made in the theater under consideration. The summary of strength and weakness factors is, then, a summary of those factors which the commander considers will affect the character of his effort. This summary indicates the relative importance of such factors.

A mere list of facts will not serve the purpose. What is needed here is a series of evaluations and conclusions which may result from a study of the pertinent details.

With the circumstances attending his particular problem clearly in mind, the commander carefully reviews each of the factors of fighting strength in the theater; he classes each as either a strength or weakness factor for himself or his opponent, and enters it in the proper column. A strength factor for one is not necessarily entered as a weakness factor for the opponent: what is required is a well-digested summary of the factors which give to either side an advantage or a disadvantage as compared to the other.

NOTE

The Estimate procedure has, to this point, established the basis for the solution of the problem through evaluation of the factors pertaining to the requirements of suitability, of feasibility, and of acceptability of the consequences as to costs.

On this basis, the commander is ready to consider such courses of action as may be pertinent. To this end, he has a choice of procedures. He may first consider courses of action for himself. He may prefer, however, to consider first those which are applicable to the enemy.

If the commander considers his own courses of action first, this procedure has an advantage in that it narrows, later, the scope of enemy courses which are pertinent to his situation. This is true because consideration of enemy courses may in such a case be restricted to those which give promise of countering, effectively, his own courses of action.

This procedure may also have a certain psychological advantage, in that the commander may thereby avoid becoming unduly impressed by the potentialities of enemy action. Occasionally, prior consideration of enemy courses may tend to put the commander, unnecessarily, on the mental defensive.

First consideration of his own courses of action is especially appropriate for a commander whose mission requires him to assume the initiative, particularly when the relative fighting strength indicates that he can compel enemy action to conform to his. This is frequently the case when enemy action will chiefly affect details rather than the general trend of the operations.

These reflections indicate that first consideration of his own courses of action will very frequently be advantageous to the commander. Such a sequence is therefore indicated preferentially in the Estimate Form, and next discussed. However occasions may arise when consideration in the reverse order is preferable. Sometimes the prior consideration of enemy potentialities has the advantage of making the commander’s estimate more complete with respect to the obstacles which he is to overcome. Furthermore, when the effectiveness of his future action is seen to depend chiefly upon what the enemy can do, or when the initiative lies manifestly with the enemy, and when the commander’s mission requires him to frustrate enemy action, rather than to assume the initiative himself, the prior consideration of enemy courses of action may be indicated.

The commander may therefore consider the subject matter of Sections ii and iii in the order hereinafter followed, or he may reverse that order.

SECTION II: DETERMINATION OF SUITABLE, FEASIBLE, AND ACCEPTABLE COURSES OF ACTION

A. Analysis of the Assigned Objective.

In order further to clarify the problem, consideration of the commander’s courses of action may profitably commence with an analysis of the assigned objective. Section I-A contained an appreciation of this objective on the basis of the salient features of the situation. A close examination is now possible in the light of the additional information furnished by the full details as to the means available and opposed, and as to the characteristics of the theater.

Accordingly, the mission, is now again stated, and is restudied. The task is thoughtfully examined anew, in view of the forces and positions now known. The purpose is scrutinized with equal care, because it indicates the further end in view for the common effort. Now, obstacles to success which, in Section I-A, could not fully be appreciated can be examined against the background afforded by visualization of the enemy’s ability to oppose the attainment of the assigned objective.

This analysis calls for such discussion by the commander as is essential to better understanding of his assigned objective. Some restatement and repetition may be desirable as to the subjects already discussed under the appreciation of the assigned objective. In solving certain types of problems, where simple estimates, only, are required, there may be no necessity for further treatment. Even in these cases, however, the commander restates his mission in this subsection, in order to ensure a clear comprehension of its task and purpose, as a sound basis for his further solution of the problem.

B. Survey of Courses of Action.

The Fundamental Military Principle represents an equation based on five factors: the appropriate effect desired, the means available, the means opposed, the characteristics of the theater, and the consequences as to costs. Of these five factors, all but the last (the consequences as to costs) have by this time, in the course of the estimate, been assigned values as definite as the commander’s information and his study permit.

From this point on, the problem is to evolve tentative solutions (courses of action) and to test them, severally, by reference to the factors. The tests as to suitability and feasibility can now be made with reference to the known factors. The test as to acceptability of the consequences involves an unknown factor. However, for each tentative solution of the problem, a value can be assigned for this factor, because all five factors are interdependent, so that the value of any of them can be set by a study of the others. It is through this procedure that evaluation of the consequences factor is accomplished.

By means of the standard tests, the several tentative solutions are also compared to each other in the light of envisaged enemy action, so as to enable the commander to select the best solution.

The commander now, as a result of his reflective thinking as to courses of action, makes a list of those which he has visualized for himself. There may be one course of action, or many; ordinarily there are several.

Examples of courses of action have been given in the basic discussion of the subject). In listing his courses, the commander can add to clarity of thought and of expression by visualizing the objective embodied in each course and by envisaging also, the action, expressed in proper detail, for its attainment. This process is naturally the more important when the objective is inferred rather than specifically expressed, and when the action involved calls for more description than can be obtained merely by stating the objective.

For example, the commander may include a course of action such as “to raid enemy trade in the area EFGH”. The objective is here inferred; it is not clearly stated. The commander may therefore be well advised to add a notation of what the objective is; indeed, more than one objective may be involved. Objectives thus inferred might include, when specifically stated, the infliction of damage on enemy trade, the infliction of damage on enemy combatant forces protecting such trade, the disruption of enemy supply arrangements, or such others as may be applicable.

This clear visualization is essential to the establishment of the relationship between the assigned objective and the objective inherent in the course of action. If, for instance, the motivating task is to “divert enemy forces to the area EFGH”, the commander may consider the course of action “to raid enemy trade in area EFGH”. By infliction of damage to, and by disruption of, enemy supply (objectives of his raiding), he expects to accomplish the diversion of enemy forces to the area EFGH, because the enemy will wish to protect his trade against such raids. The relationship between the assigned objective and the objective inferred in the course of action is thus made clear.

With regard to expression of the action to be taken, the commander may properly desire to be more explicit than by merely saying, for example, “to destroy the enemy”. Here the objective is clear (it is “the destruction of the enemy"), but the expression of the action is so general that additional description may be needed. Examples of more explicit statement have been given previously.

On occasion the higher commander may predetermine the commander’s course of action for the attainment of the objective assigned to the latter. Circumstances under which such procedure may be properly applicable, and the effect which it has on the commander’s estimate, have been previously discussed.

C. Application of Tests for Suitability, Feasibility, and Acceptability.

The courses of action which the commander has envisaged are now subjected to test. This essential stage in thought is intended to put the courses of action to proof as tentative solutions of the problems. The principle here recognized is that suggestion has no logical nor rightful claim upon action or belief until it has received adequate confirmation. Such confirmation is, in part, provided by these tests.

The tests applied are for suitability, for feasibility, and for acceptability as to consequences. Each of these tests is a separate one. Each course of action is formally subjected to test. When the tests are completed, the courses of action stand classified in these respects. During these tests, some courses of action may be rejected; such are then omitted in the final classification.

These formal tests are not to be confused with the preliminary tests already given by the commander to each course of action as it occurs to mind. Necessarily, there is such a preliminary test, because the commander does not wish to entertain inappropriate courses of action. For a competent commander, the mental power to envisage solutions of a military problem is so much grounded in experience that appropriate suggestions are most likely to occur; in fact, discriminating thought with respect to military problems is natural for such a commander. This immediate discrimination is, however, merely the preliminary test. It prevents setting up wooden soldiers only to knock them down, but it does not necessarily subject each suggested solution to a thorough analysis.

The commander may apply the tests to each course of action as it occurs to his mind. This procedure, however, may be rendered impossible by the fertility of suggestion; perhaps the commander has thought of several courses of action practically simultaneously. It is, therefore, often better to apply the tests to all of the courses of action, in turn, during a separate stage of the process of thinking. This is the procedure indicated herein, as standard, by the sequence of steps in this section of the Estimate. The process of testing, itself, may bring to mind those combinations of courses of action previously referred to.

The degree of formality characteristic of the tests varies with the nature of the problem. In a broad strategical estimate, these tests may be searching and extensive; they may then consume much time. Yet, if the commander, in making a quick decision of great urgency in actual battle, does not apply the tests, he may adopt a course of action leading to tragic results. In such circumstances, the competent commander, under pressure of danger, grasps the whole complex situation without loss of time. He is not carried away by any chance impressions. He does not overlook what is significant in the unexpected event. Because he is mentally prepared for the exercise of command he sees things in their true proportions. In immediate response, he coolly chooses the same course of action which he would adopt if he had time for careful deliberation.

In making the tests, the commander rejects courses of action found unsuitable in that they will not, if successfully prosecuted, contribute to the attainment of the objective. He does not, as yet, reject courses of action found to be promising of only partial accomplishment of the task, because there may be later possibilities of effecting combinations to this end.

The commander also rejects, at this point, courses of action found to be infeasible of accomplishment. He is careful, however, not to reject, abruptly, any which may later be found to be feasible in combination with other courses.

Similarly, the commander now rejects courses of action found to involve excessive consequences as to costs. Here, again, however, he bears in mind the possibilities of later combinations.

The commander does not, as yet, make a selection of one course of action in preference to another. He merely desires to restrict further thought, toward his Decision, to those which are found, on the basis of the estimate so far, to be suitable, feasible, and acceptable. He may, however, make a selection to the extent of effecting proper combinations whose applicability has already been demonstrated.

The commander also takes stock, at this stage of the estimate, of the relative degree of suitability, feasibility, and acceptability of retained courses, so far as can be substantiated.

D. Listing Retained Courses of Action.

The foregoing process indicates to the commander the courses of action which may properly be retained as suitable, as feasible, and as acceptable. He therefore draws up a list of retained courses and classifies them according to the degree of their suitability, of their feasibility, and of their acceptability with respect to consequences.

This list does not necessarily represent the final combinations of courses of action; the incomplete solutions may yet become part of the course of action finally selected. Also it is not impossible that combinations already made will subsequently be recombined as a result of further analysis.

It may be apparent to the commander at this time that he does not have, as yet, any course of action which fulfills the test of suitability as to scope, either originally or by combination. A later conclusion is made as to final combinations to achieve full scope. This conclusion, however, may point the way, as later observed, to a Decision adopting an objective short of that which would, if achieved, lead to the accomplishment of the motivating task.

SECTION III: EXAMINATION INTO THE CAPABILITIES OF THE ENEMY

While the commander realizes that the Fundamental Military Principle governs the enemy’s problem no less than his own, he has to accept more of hypothesis and conjecture (the so-called “fog of war”) in applying the principle to the enemy’s situation. The method of reflective thinking utilized for the commander’s own problem calls for certain further safeguards in application to the enemy capabilities, since they are of course usually not so well known to the commander as are his own.

Capabilities, in the meaning applicable herein, indicate actions which the force concerned, unless forestalled or prevented from taking such actions, has the capacity to carry out. Such potentialities of the enemy are of course among the vital factors to be considered in estimating the situation. In his estimate, however, the commander’s interest is not confined to what the enemy will probably do; probabilities are subject to change, and do not, therefore, cover the whole field of capabilities. The commander is not exclusively interested in what the enemy may intend to do, or even in what the enemy may be known, at the time, to intend to do; such intentions are also subject to change. The commander is interested in everything that the enemy can do which may materially influence the commander’s own courses of action.

In reaching a conclusion as to enemy capabilities, the commander makes an estimate from the enemy’s viewpoint and considers that the enemy commander, faced with the counterpart of his own situation, is endeavoring to attain objectives in furtherance of his own mission. Each commander is endeavoring to create for himself a favorable military situation, and to prevent his opponent from succeeding in the same intent. The physical objectives for each may be the other’s armed forces; certain positions, sea areas, harbors, or territory may also be likely physical objectives.

In such a parallel building up of plans, it is possible that the opposing forces may not come, at least for a time, into actual conflict. More especially in the initial stages, the respective plans may lead to operations in different parts of the theater. Again, the geographical direction of search may cause the forces to miss contact. Moreover, unless one commander definitely makes provision to seek out and engage, the two forces, each on the defensive, may find themselves “shaking fists” at each other across an ocean area.

Notwithstanding this possibility, however, a conclusion, on an insufficient basis, that the enemy will or will not seek him out and engage him, or that the enemy will or will not do anything else, may be fraught with the most serious consequences for the commander. Accordingly, in estimating the enemy’s situation, he puts himself in the enemy’s position, while subordinating his own hopes and desires. He credits the enemy with the possession of good judgment and of the resolution and ability to apply with skill the fundamentals of effective warfare, subject, naturally, to the justified conclusions which the commander has drawn on the basis of the available factual data as to relative fighting strength.

A. Survey of the Enemy’s Problem.

This portion of the commander’s estimate pertains, of course, to the existing situation as viewed by the enemy. This fact, alone, may inject into the problem certain factors which differ from those applicable with respect to the commander’s view of his own problem, as determined to this point.

(1) Summary of the Enemy’s Situation.

Frequently it may happen that the enemy does not have certain significant information. The fact of such lack of information may have been established by the conclusions drawn as to relative fighting strength. If this be the case, notation of the fact is made at this point in the commander’s estimate of the enemy’s situation. If doubt exists as to the extent and accuracy of the enemy’s information, it will be desirable to credit the enemy with any knowledge which it would be dangerous for the commander to conclude was not available to his opponent.

In summarizing the enemy’s situation, the commander may brief the procedure by indicating those significant features of his own situation, as summarized in Section I-A and as particularized in Section I-B, which he does not consider are known to the enemy. The commander will also indicate here any items of important information as to which he has only a suggestion or an inkling, but which he considers may be known in greater detail to the enemy.

(2) Analysis of the Effect Desired by the Enemy.

It may appear on first thought that the best basis for determining the pertinent enemy courses of action is to make a deduction of the enemy’s mission. Sometimes, undoubtedly, this is the case. However, it is not always possible to deduce the enemy’s mission correctly. If the deduction is incorrect the remainder of the estimate will be on an unsound basis. If, as may happen, the enemy’s plan has been captured, or if, by some other method, conclusive information has been obtained, it may be possible to state the enemy’s mission. Even then, however, the enemy’s mission may sometimes be changed. It is thus evident that the commander, by restricting his thought, may frequently fail to consider all of the enemy capabilities which may materially influence his own course of action.

With this precaution in mind, the commander, at this point in his Estimate, proceeds to analyze the effect desired by the enemy. The commander intends to use his deductions, if such use appears to be sound, to narrow the field of consideration as to enemy courses of action. However, he reminds himself that such restriction will be dangerous unless it is established on sound grounds.

The first mental act toward determining the effect desired by the enemy is to form a reasoned opinion as to the situation which the enemy wishes to maintain or to create. The maintenance or creation of this situation, existent or to be brought about, is an enemy objective.

From earlier association with the enemy, from intelligence of his peacetime preparations, and from a knowledge of his political and military history, his broad current policies are generally matters of common report. The motives impelling the enemy to action may thus be evident. Past or present tendencies of the enemy, along certain specific lines of endeavor, may be known. These may be corroborated by the enemy action which has recently occurred.

In military undertakings of major scope the objectives of the enemy are often difficult of concealment. A survey of the objectives which the enemy has been pursuing may allow a reasoned opinion to be formed as to the enemy’s immediate objectives, whether, at least, his future action will be offensive or defensive. The importance to be attached by the enemy to certain physical objectives may be indicated by the broad aims known to exist. Present composition and disposition of the enemy’s forces may betray the effort which he intends. Circumstances, clearly disadvantageous to the commander’s forces, may disclose what his enemy’s aim may be for maintaining or creating a favorable (enemy) military situation.

However scant or incomplete the data from such sources or from others, the commander seeks to gain, by piecing together, a composite basis of workable value in arriving at a sound conclusion as to the enemy’s future action.

The enemy objective thus visualized may serve as the purpose of the enemy’s mission. The situation thus envisaged may be specific or broad in nature, depending on the soundness of the deductions. This, in turn, will depend on the extent and character of the information available.

It may now be possible to deduce a definite task, which when accomplished, will attain the indicated purpose. However, as previously stated, it is not desirable to be unduly specific. The commander reflects on the several possibilities which if carried out will attain the purpose. By being inclusive instead of restrictive in this matter, he avoids the danger of overlooking enemy capabilities. Moreover, the information available will not always justify the derivation of a specific task.

By this process of reasoning, the commander may arrive at a studied opinion as to the enemy’s appropriate effect desired. The commander’s safeguard is that he has not been too restrictive or specific. He expects to encompass within his conclusion the limits of the enemy’s objectives and actions, so that his own planned action will not fail to cover all enemy action which can materially influence the situation.

Situations may be encountered when, in the equation referred to in Section ii-B, no value can be assigned the factor of the appropriate effect desired which will constitute a sufficient basis for deducing enemy courses of action. Such situations are not unusual, especially in problems of lesser scope. In such cases, the commander is compelled to consider all possible enemy courses of action which can materially influence his own plan. Therefore, in instances of this nature, it is apparent that the procedure of giving first consideration to the commander’s own courses of action affords the advantage of narrowing the field as to the enemy capabilities.

B. Survey of Enemy Capabilities.

If, then (to repeat, because of the importance of the matter), the commander believes that he has, in the deduced enemy effect desired, a sufficient basis for evolving all pertinent enemy capabilities, he now proceeds, by the mental process described in Section ii, to list the enemy courses of action which he thinks merit attention. If there be no adequate basis, the commander will find it desirable to list all enemy courses of action which can materially affect his own effort.

The survey of fighting strength has established, through consideration of the “means available and opposed”, and of the “characteristics of the theater”, the limitations of enemy capabilities from the standpoint of feasibility. Because, however, so much of the enemy’s situation is usually conjectural, it is important to give the most searching attention to the comparison summary in Section I-B, in fact, to consider fully every element of weakness and strength, and of advantage and disadvantage. Such a study will disclose every possibility which the enemy might exploit. The commander may thus determine, for example, the enemy strength which can be moved into positions within time limits that can affect the commander’s courses of action; he can also examine into possibilities of obtaining information concerning the enemy’s moves.

Such a study enables the commander to envisage the enemy operations which presumably can materially affect his own plans. He may now list the presumed capabilities of the enemy, in the form of courses of action, for purposes of further analysis. Naturally, he lists courses which appear to be suitable, feasible, and acceptable as to consequences, but formal tests are deferred until the next phase of the estimate.

C. Application of Tests for Suitability, Feasibility, and Acceptability.

Having listed pertinent enemy courses of action as described above, the commander next tests them for suitability, for feasibility, and for acceptability as to their consequences.

The procedure is the same as for his own courses of action. However, since the enemy’s appropriate effect desired, if deducible at all, is often only an approximation, the test for suitability is usually less rigid or absolute than for the commander’s own courses of action. By the same token, since the enemy’s fighting strength will usually include elements of conjecture and hypothesis, the test for feasibility may be less reliable than when applied to the commander’s own courses. In fact, if there are any reasonable doubts as to feasibility of an enemy course of action, it is properly retained for further consideration. The same considerations and the same safeguard apply with respect to acceptability of the consequences.

D. Listing Retained Enemy Courses of Action.

All enemy courses of action which, after test, are retained for further study are now listed by the commander.

While it is manifestly of advantage to the commander if the number of enemy courses can reasonably be reduced to only a few or even to one, it is important that no material enemy capability be neglected because of undue restriction of the field.

The previous analysis will have indicated, at least, in some cases, the degree of suitability and feasibility, and will have enabled the commander to form a considered opinion as to any preference, from the enemy viewpoint, on the basis of consequences as to costs.

In many instances, therefore, it will be possible to arrange retained enemy courses in order of priority, i.e., the more likely being listed before the less likely. In case of doubt, the higher priority is awarded by the commander to enemy courses which are more dangerous from his (the commander’s) point of view.

In other instances, no priority can properly be indicated.

As a result of this study, the commander may now be able to combine certain enemy courses. In any case, he closes this portion of the estimate with a list of them, classified so far as he finds justifiable, and thus made available for further effective use in the estimate.

SECTION IV: SELECTION OF THE BEST COURSE OF ACTION

The extent to which detail is desirable in Section iv of the Estimate will vary with the nature of the problem. Experience usually demonstrates, however, that an estimate in only the necessary detail escapes the danger inherent in undue detail which would tend to befog the main issues. As the commander proceeds with his estimate, he will recognize the need for additional examination into details, and will conduct such examination accordingly.

A. Analysis and Comparison of Retained Courses of Action.

The next step in the estimate is the natural one of comparing the commander’s retained courses of action with those of the enemy which have been retained for further study. This process consists of executing, in imagination, the plan contained in each of the commander’s courses of action, against that in each of the enemy’s. One method is for the Commander to take the initiative with each of his plans and mentally to push it through with vigor. By this procedure, he concentrates his thought on the effect to be produced, on the changed situation which that effect will bring about for the enemy, on the modification in the enemy’s effort which will be caused, on the resulting obstacles which these modifications will create, and on the provisions which will have to be made to overcome the obstacles.

It will at once be apparent that the commander may have to re-estimate the enemy situation during this analysis. Such necessity arises because of the changes made by his own course of action upon the enemy situation. The commander will desire to reach a studied conclusion as to what counter action the enemy may take when the nature of the planned action against him becomes evident. This re-estimate of the situation may be brief, as it is an adjustment of factors which are familiar through previous examination. Sometimes the re-estimate will have been made mentally, before reaching this point, and adjustments may already have been made in the written estimate, in anticipation of this contingency. Sometimes the commander may find it desirable, after reaching this point, to re-write, at least in part, his original enemy estimate. The particular procedure adopted is unimportant; the important feature is to recognize that such a re-estimate process is normal, and especially so with reference to this portion of the Estimate.

The foregoing discussion illustrates the point that an examination into enemy capabilities is not complete if the commander puts himself in the enemy’s place merely for the purpose of estimating the original situation from the enemy viewpoint. In addition, the commander examines each of the enemy’s modified problems which the changed situation, created by the execution of the commander’s plan, has superimposed upon the enemy’s original problem. Thus only can the commander analyze the various ways whereby the enemy may oppose his own proposed courses of action. Thus only may sound conclusion later be reached, in the next subsection of the estimate, as to what course of action, or combination of courses, is the best.

The comparison of plan against plan thus far has been restricted to the method whereby the commander takes the initiative with each of his own retained courses of action. Another method is to imagine the enemy as taking the initiative, carrying through each of his courses against each of the commander’s courses. This method is applicable, for instance, to cases where the enemy is able to initiate action which, by its nature, would frustrate the execution of any of the commander’s courses. The choice of methods is a matter of judgment on the part of the commander.

It is rarely that courses of action can be compared without resolving each, to some extent, into the detailed operations which it comprises. However, this analysis is confined, as previously explained, to the details whose consideration is necessary for purposes of a sound comparison. In some cases there may be need for study in the greatest detail. Generally, however, the requirement can be met by considering for each operation the kind of action, the types of weapons, and the physical objectives.

During the progress of these analyses of the impact of operations upon each other, there may occur to mind further operations which an alert and awakened enemy may undertake in opposition; the counter to these operations may also suggest itself.

The use of the chart, with positions and forces plotted, is here frequently essential; in tactical problems diagrams and tables showing possibilities of position, distance, speed, maneuver, gun ranges, relative strength in types and weapons are useful.

Through the procedure described above, the commander is afforded further opportunity to test his courses of action, as to suitability, feasibility, and acceptability. He can, once more, view each of his courses from the standpoint of its suitability. The visualized enemy action may introduce considerations, not previously realized, as to whether certain of his own courses are suitable to the appropriate effect desired, when results are envisaged on the basis of the possible opposition. As to feasibility, the analysis permits him to make a further estimate of the enemy capabilities with respect to obstructing or preventing the desired outcome of his (the commander’s) courses of action. In addition, by visualizing the pertinent operations involved, he enables himself to evaluate the costs to be expected.

Should the commander conclude, at this stage, that further consideration of any of his courses, so far retained, is not justified, he will naturally reject such courses so as to confine further analysis within narrower limits.

Should he find, during his analysis, that further combinations should be made among his retained courses, he makes such combinations and uses them in his comparison.

However, he defers, until the next subsection, his choice of the course to be finally selected, or his conclusion that none can justifiably be adopted. The process of comparison is confined to deduction, rearrangement, and justified rejection, preliminary to weighing and selecting in the next subsection.

B. Determination of the Best Course of Action.

The commander is now ready to ponder over his retained courses of action as further analyzed in the light of enemy opposition. All of these courses, if carried out, are presumably competent, in varying extent, to attain the appropriate effect desired. He will now examine and consider them with the specific intent of coming to a conclusion as to which one, or which combination, he will select as the best. The analysis of each course of action in comparison with each enemy course has made possible a comparison, to this end, of the commander’s retained courses with each other.

At this point, therefore, the commander again assembles his retained courses of action.

He includes the combinations which the preceding analysis has indicated belong properly together. He then considers the final tabulation in the light of the considerations now to be noted.

The conclusive tests are now made for suitability, for feasibility, and for acceptability as to consequences. Because of the importance of this terminal analysis, it is desirable that the tests be as precise as possible.

The commander now has, in addition to his list of the retained courses of action, a summarized comparison of each with the others, under the several pertinent headings. He next examines this all-inclusive summary, with the intent of selecting the best course of action.

It may be found that one, or another, or a combination, is best. Again, there is the possibility of considering, as best, a course of action which, if carried out, will only complete an initial stage toward the accomplishment of the motivating task.

If the result of the analysis has demonstrated that there is no satisfactory course of action, this fact is here stated, with a notation as to the reasons for such opinion. In this case the commander faces a dilemma.

Usually a task imposed on the commander by higher authority will be a carefully considered assignment of part of the superior’s planned effort. The commander may expect normally to find that his own estimate of the situation will yield courses of action which, if successfully carried out, will accomplish the task assigned. The reasoned plan of the superior is a safeguard in this respect.

Nevertheless, realism requires that the commander be fully prepared to meet the possible dilemma: When he cannot envisage a course of action for accomplishing the assigned task, or when, of the several courses of action under consideration, he finds none satisfactory, what is he to do?.

Under these circumstances the commander reviews his estimate in all its aspects. By minute re-examination he endeavors to find ways of accomplishing his assigned task. If he cannot accomplish the task, he seeks for ways whereby he can further such accomplishment so far as is reasonably feasible. If unable, in any degree, to further the accomplishment of his task, he endeavors to contribute, so far as he feasibly and acceptably can, to the accomplishment of the purpose of his mission.

It is to be expected, of course, that, if unable to accomplish his assigned task, the commander will make constructive representations to higher authority. The latter may then assign additional forces or may otherwise alter the problem, for example, by assigning a new task. However, a situation such as described may occur when the commander is alone in a distant theater or when for other reasons he finds himself unable to communicate, in time, with higher authority.

In such a situation the commander is under the necessity of determining, for himself, a task which is suitable, feasible, and acceptable under the circumstances.

It is evident that, at some point in the foregoing procedure, the commander has been forced to abandon the solution of his basic problem, because he has found that there is no sound solution. He has not completely abandoned the solution of his original problem, because he has not yet exhausted all of its possibilities. However, the solution of the original problem has unquestionably entered a new phase, or step.

The new step presents the commander with a new problem, a phase in the solution of the original problem; the new problem is related to the abandoned basic problem, because it arises out of the same situation, which has not changed. The new problem is, however, differentiated from the basic problem because it is based on a different incentive. The incentive for the solution of the new problem arises directly out of a decision made by the commander himself, i.e., his decision that no sound solution for the basic problem can be found. The new problem is one for the commander himself to solve, i.e., it cannot properly be delegated to a subordinate for solution, because its solution is necessary as a basis for the commander’s detailed plan. For these reasons the new problem is, by definition, a subsidiary problem, of the type distinctive of the second step.

At what point in the solution of the original problem does the commander abandon the basic problem and proceed with the solution of the new, subsidiary problem which has arisen as described? There are various possible answers, all with a basis of reason, to this question.

From the standpoint of theoretical precision, it might be said that the basic problem is abandoned when the conclusion is reached that its motivating task cannot be accomplished. It might also be said that the basic problem is abandoned when the conclusion is reached that the commander can in no way contribute toward the accomplishment of the motivating task.

Practical experience indicates, however, that the basic estimate can profitably be utilized until the conclusion is reached that no contribution can be made to the purpose of the mission. At this point a new estimate, subsidiary to the basic estimate, necessarily begins. This view is confirmed, theoretically, by the fact that, at this point in the procedure, a radical change occurs with respect to the appropriate effect desired. In such circumstances, the commander concludes that he cannot contribute, in any degree, to the accomplishment of his immediate superior’s general plan.

The incentive for the solution of the subsidiary problem will therefore arise, on the basis thus adopted, when the commander has concluded that he cannot contribute to the accomplishment of his basic mission, and that he is under the necessity of evolving a new mission for himself. His basic Decision will reflect this conclusion and will thereby afford him a basis for the solution of his subsidiary problem.

Problems of the foregoing nature, where the commander justifiably departs from his instructions, are not unusual during the first step. However, they are scarcely typical of that step so long as an organized chain of command is in effective operation. In the more usual case, the commander, at this point in his estimate, makes note of his selected course of action. Whether he selects a single course or a combination, the selection is thereafter known as the best course of action (singular).

SECTION V: THE DECISION

In the final section of the Estimate the commander is concerned with a decision as to the selection of an objective or objectives determined by himself, for the attainment of the appropriate effect desired. This decision also indicates, in proper detail, the action to be taken for the attainment of the commander’s selected objective. The decision reached at this point becomes the commander’s general plan of action or provides the basis therefor. It is accordingly so important that when it has been formally stated in a basic problem it is thenceforth known as the Decision.

The Statement of the Decision. Frequently the statement of the Decision may be merely a restatement of the best course of action. Such phraseology is often adequate, provided, naturally, that the selected course of action has been, itself, correctly expressed. Sometimes, however, the commander may desire, at this point in his estimate, to develop such expression more fully. He may at this point develop his selected course into a general plan, or he may defer this development to the second step.

In any event the commander now scrutinizes his selected course of action to ensure that its expression conveys exactly the meaning which he has in mind.

He bears in mind, also, that his Decision will settle the pattern of his future action. If the selected objective is inferred, rather than specifically stated, the commander will then ensure that the inference, with all its vital implications, is plain.

As to the statement of the action required to achieve this objective, the commander realizes that the pattern laid down by the Decision is merely a shape or general outline. The details will be introduced later. The Decision covers the general outline of the action contemplated for the entire force.

If, for example, only a part of the commander’s force is to act, while the remainder is to remain inactive, the Decision will cover not only the kind of activity but also the extent of the inactivity. However, for convenience in stating the Decision, such inactivity may be inferred, rather than expressly stated, so long as the meaning is made clear. Thus, if the force, except for a raiding task group, is to remain inactive for the time being, the Decision may properly be “to raid enemy communications in the area with a task group consisting of “, so long as the commander is satisfied that the implication is clear, under the circumstances, that the remainder of his force is to remain inactive.

The commander may properly include brief summarizing remarks as to the methods, broadly viewed, whereby he intends to take action. However, he introduces such detail only to the extent that he feels amplification is needed, either for his own benefit or for the assistance of others who may use his estimate.

Deductions or inferences which the commander wishes to note may, at this point, be included with the Decision as corollaries.

Where combinations of courses of action have been made in selecting the best course, the meaning can sometimes be improved at this point by modification of the previous wording.

When, as previously discussed, the commander has concluded that he cannot feasibly or acceptably adopt any course of action which will accomplish his task, contribute in any measure to its accomplishment, or even contribute in any degree to the accomplishment of the purpose of his mission, he records that fact in his Decision. His study of the problem will by this time, however, have given him the necessary data for a conclusion as to what his new mission should be. He therefore closes his basic estimate with a Decision, coupled with a purpose therefor, which will serve as a new mission, i.e., as an appropriate effect desired. This provides a basis for his solution of a subsidiary problem whose incentive is derived from this Decision.

Of course, if the commander has had time and opportunity to represent his situation on this basis to higher authority, and has received a new task therefrom, the new task, coupled with the purpose also indicated by higher authority, will provide the mission for the solution of a new basic problem.

The Purpose of the Decision. The purpose of the Decision is identical with the motivating task, provided, of course, that the Decision, if carried out, will accomplish that task in full. When stated, the purpose is usually connected with the Decision by the words “in order to”.

If the commander has concluded that he will take action by stages, the Decision may cover only the first stage. In all cases where the Decision will only partially accomplish the motivating task, appropriate words to link the Decision to its purpose may be such as “to assist in” or “preparatory to”.

The statement of this purpose, in connection with the Decision, is frequently helpful and is sometimes necessary in making clear the exact relationship between the Decision and the motivating task. In the next planning step, where the detailed operations are determined, this purpose is an important guide because each detailed operation is expected to contribute to the accomplishment, not only of the Decision, but also of the motivating task.

Corollaries to the Decision. The Decision may involve certain deductions or inferences, either delimiting or amplifying its nature. The commander may find it desirable to make note of these matters in connection with his Decision. He may later wish to use these notes when formulating his plan. Since these matters relate to deductions or inferences which naturally follow as results of the Decision they are properly referred to as “corollaries” to the Decision.

The nature of such corollaries may best be shown by an example. It is supposed, for instance, that the commander has made the Decision “to guard the Eastern Caribbean barrier against enemy penetration”. During the course of his estimate of the situation, he has come to the conclusion that his operations to carry out this Decision will extend into the area limited by Port X on the north, and Port Y on the south. This conclusion is a deduction, which immediately assumes importance when the Decision is made. The commander states this deduced conclusion here, in connection with the Decision, for future guidance in resolving the Decision into detailed operations, as well as for later use in his directives to limit the action of his subordinates.

No particular form is specified for such corollaries. It is satisfactory to list them as Corollary I, Corollary ii, etc. They do not constitute a part of the Decision.

Relation of the Decision to the Detailed Plan and Directives. The Decision is the basis for the commander’s plan of action for his entire force. This plan is promulgated in one or more directives. The Decision, as it appears in the Estimate, is not yet the concern of subordinate commanders. It does not become their concern until it is used in directives. As incorporated in the commander’s detailed plan and in his directives, the Decision, whether further developed or not, constitutes the commander’s general plan and is referred to in those terms.

The Decision, as it appears in the Estimate, is not bound by any rigid specifications as to form. Later, when the commander prepares for the inauguration of planned action by the formulation and issue of directives, he assumes the obligation of conveying the substance of his Decision to his subordinates in clear language. At that time he will again have to subject its expression to scrutiny, and may find that he has to make modifications solely for clarification.