CHAPTER I - INTRODUCTION IN DEFENCE OF EVERYTHING ELSE
The only possible excuse for
this book is that it is an answer to a challenge.
Even a bad shot is dignified when he accepts a duel.
When some time ago I published a series of hasty but
sincere papers, under the name of “Heretics,”
several critics for whose intellect I have a warm
respect (I may mention specially Mr. G.S.Street) said
that it was all very well for me to tell everybody
to affirm his cosmic theory, but that I had carefully
avoided supporting my precepts with example.
“I will begin to worry about my philosophy,”
said Mr. Street, “when Mr. Chesterton has given
us his.” It was perhaps an incautious suggestion
to make to a person only too ready to write books
upon the feeblest provocation. But after all,
though Mr. Street has inspired and created this book,
he need not read it. If he does read it, he will
find that in its pages I have attempted in a vague
and personal way, in a set of mental pictures rather
than in a series of deductions, to state the philosophy
in which I have come to believe. I will not call
it my philosophy; for I did not make it. God
and humanity made it; and it made me.
I have often had a fancy for
writing a romance about an English yachtsman who slightly
miscalculated his course and discovered England under
the impression that it was a new island in the South
Seas. I always find, however, that I am either
too busy or too lazy to write this fine work, so I
may as well give it away for the purposes of philosophical
illustration. There will probably be a general
impression that the man who landed (armed to the teeth
and talking by signs) to plant the British flag on
that barbaric temple which turned out to be the Pavilion
at Brighton, felt rather a fool. I am not here
concerned to deny that he looked a fool. But
if you imagine that he felt a fool, or at any rate
that the sense of folly was his sole or his dominant
emotion, then you have not studied with sufficient
delicacy the rich romantic nature of the hero of this
tale. His mistake was really a most enviable
mistake; and he knew it, if he was the man I take
him for. What could be more delightful than
to have in the same few minutes all the fascinating
terrors of going abroad combined with all the humane
security of coming home again? What could be
better than to have all the fun of discovering South
Africa without the disgusting necessity of landing
there? What could be more glorious than to brace
one’s self up to discover New South Wales and
then realize, with a gush of happy tears, that it
was really old South Wales. This at least seems
to me the main problem for philosophers, and is in
a manner the main problem of this book. How can
we contrive to be at once astonished at the world
and yet at home in it? How can this queer cosmic
town, with its many-legged citizens, with its monstrous
and ancient lamps, how can this world give us at once
the fascination of a strange town and the comfort and
honour of being our own town?
To show that a faith or a philosophy
is true from every standpoint would be too big an
undertaking even for a much bigger book than this;
it is necessary to follow one path of argument; and
this is the path that I here propose to follow.
I wish to set forth my faith as particularly answering
this double spiritual need, the need for that mixture
of the familiar and the unfamiliar which Christendom
has rightly named romance. For the very word
“romance” has in it the mystery and ancient
meaning of Rome. Any one setting out to dispute
anything ought always to begin by saying what he does
not dispute. Beyond stating what he proposes
to prove he should always state what he does not propose
to prove. The thing I do not propose to prove,
the thing I propose to take as common ground between
myself and any average reader, is this desirability
of an active and imaginative life, picturesque and
full of a poetical curiosity, a life such as western
man at any rate always seems to have desired.
If a man says that extinction is better than existence
or blank existence better than variety and adventure,
then he is not one of the ordinary people to whom I
am talking. If a man prefers nothing I can give
him nothing. But nearly all people I have ever
met in this western society in which I live would
agree to the general proposition that we need this
life of practical romance; the combination of something
that is strange with something that is secure.
We need so to view the world as to combine an idea
of wonder and an idea of welcome. We need to
be happy in this wonderland without once being merely
comfortable. It is this achievement of my
creed that I shall chiefly pursue in these pages.
But I have a peculiar reason
for mentioning the man in a yacht, who discovered
England. For I am that man in a yacht.
I discovered England. I do not see how this book
can avoid being egotistical; and I do not quite see
(to tell the truth) how it can avoid being dull.
Dulness will, however, free me from the charge which
I most lament; the charge of being flippant.
Mere light sophistry is the thing that I happen to
despise most of all things, and it is perhaps a wholesome
fact that this is the thing of which I am generally
accused. I know nothing so contemptible as a
mere paradox; a mere ingenious defence of the indefensible.
If it were true (as has been said) that Mr. Bernard
Shaw lived upon paradox, then he ought to be a mere
common millionaire; for a man of his mental activity
could invent a sophistry every six minutes.
It is as easy as lying; because it is lying.
The truth is, of course, that Mr. Shaw is cruelly hampered
by the fact that he cannot tell any lie unless he
thinks it is the truth. I find myself under the
same intolerable bondage. I never in my life
said anything merely because I thought it funny; though
of course, I have had ordinary human vainglory, and
may have thought it funny because I had said it.
It is one thing to describe an interview with a gorgon
or a griffin, a creature who does not exist.
It is another thing to discover that the rhinoceros
does exist and then take pleasure in the fact that
he looks as if he didn’t. One searches
for truth, but it may be that one pursues instinctively
the more extraordinary truths. And I offer this
book with the heartiest sentiments to all the jolly
people who hate what I write, and regard it (very
justly, for all I know), as a piece of poor clowning
or a single tiresome joke.
For if this book is a joke it
is a joke against me. I am the man who with the
utmost daring discovered what had been discovered
before. If there is an element of farce in what
follows, the farce is at my own expense; for this
book explains how I fancied I was the first to set
foot in Brighton and then found I was the last.
It recounts my elephantine adventures in pursuit of
the obvious. No one can think my case more ludicrous
than I think it myself; no reader can accuse me here
of trying to make a fool of him: I am the fool
of this story, and no rebel shall hurl me from my
throne. I freely confess all the idiotic ambitions
of the end of the nineteenth century. I did,
like all other solemn little boys, try to be in advance
of the age. Like them I tried to be some ten
minutes in advance of the truth. And I found
that I was eighteen hundred years behind it.
I did strain my voice with a painfully juvenile exaggeration
in uttering my truths. And I was punished in
the fittest and funniest way, for I have kept my truths:
but I have discovered, not that they were not truths,
but simply that they were not mine. When I fancied
that I stood alone I was really in the ridiculous
position of being backed up by all Christendom.
It may be, Heaven forgive me, that I did try to be
original; but I only succeeded in inventing all by
myself an inferior copy of the existing traditions
of civilized religion. The man from the yacht
thought he was the first to find England; I thought
I was the first to find Europe. I did try to
found a heresy of my own; and when I had put the last
touches to it, I discovered that it was orthodoxy.
It may be that somebody will
be entertained by the account of this happy fiasco.
It might amuse a friend or an enemy to read how I
gradually learnt from the truth of some stray legend
or from the falsehood of some dominant philosophy,
things that I might have learnt from my catechism-if
I had ever learnt it. There may or may not be
some entertainment in reading how I found at last
in an anarchist club or a Babylonian temple what I
might have found in the nearest parish church.
If any one is entertained by learning how the flowers
of the field or the phrases in an omnibus, the accidents
of politics or the pains of youth came together in
a certain order to produce a certain conviction of
Christian orthodoxy, he may possibly read this book.
But there is in everything a reasonable division of
labour. I have written the book, and nothing
on earth would induce me to read it.
I add one purely pedantic note
which comes, as a note naturally should, at the beginning
of the book. These essays are concerned only
to discuss the actual fact that the central Christian
theology (sufficiently summarized in the Apostles’
Creed) is the best root of energy and sound ethics.
They are not intended to discuss the very fascinating
but quite different question of what is the present
seat of authority for the proclamation of that creed.
When the word “orthodoxy” is used here
it means the Apostles’ Creed, as understood
by everybody calling himself Christian until a very
short time ago and the general historic conduct of
those who held such a creed. I have been forced
by mere space to confine myself to what I have got
from this creed; I do not touch the matter much disputed
among modern Christians, of where we ourselves got
it. This is not an ecclesiastical treatise but
a sort of slovenly autobiography. But if any
one wants my opinions about the actual nature of the
authority, Mr. G.S.Street has only to throw me another
challenge, and I will write him another book.